The Yanks Are Striking: Kern County, the 1921 Oil Strike and the Discourse on Americanism by Hussey, Peter F
THE YANKS ARE STRIKING: KERN COUNTY, THE 1921 OIL STRIKE 








the Faculty of California Polytechnic State University, 
San Luis Obispo  
 
 
In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 


















































 The Yanks Are Striking: Kern 
County, the 1921 Oil Strike and 



























 Andrew D. Morris, Ph.D. 
Professor of History 
 
 
Sarah Bridger, Ph.D. 
Associate Professor of History 
 
Elizabeth Sine, Ph.D. 










In the fall of 1921 oil workers of the San Joaquin Valley faced a post-war 
economic slump, wage cuts across the board and an increasingly hostile attitude 
of oil operators towards consultation with the federal government on labor 
relations. They voted to strike, and the next day eight thousand workers walked 
off the fields.  Strikers crafted an image of “patriotic unionism,” underpinned by a 
faith in the federal government and the ideology of the American Legion.  The 
strike did not end in gruesome class warfare like had been seen months earlier in 
the coal mines of West Virginia, but rather in ideological confusion and despair. 
The oil workers movement never fully embraced a class identity; instead it 
embraced the burgeoning conservative identity of Americanism.  This effectively 
hobbled the growth of the movement.  Upon the strike’s conclusion there was no 
mass pull to the left on the part of oil workers in the San Joaquin Valley, despite 
the fact that their movement’s design and identity had gotten them nowhere. On 
the contrary a portion of workers and supporters of the strike turned to the 
nativism of the Klan.  Overall this project looks to complicate the narrative of “us 
vs. them” in labor history by analyzing workers’ identities, and also looks to 
contribute to the ever-evolving discourse on how historians should track 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
If you were to drive from California’s Yosemite Valley to the Central Coast, 
you would most likely take State Route 41. It is an unusual stretch of highway, 
one that takes its motorists through a myriad of landscapes, from ponderosa pine 
to the coastal piers that protrude into the Pacific.  As you leave the seemingly 
infinite flatness of the San Joaquin Valley headed southwest, the landscape 
changes into a rolling hill country and for a brief moment you pass into the 
northwestern tip of Kern County.  This point demarcates the north door into an 
underground sea of oil that still flows today.  This sea stretches from Devil’s Den 
south, buttressing the hills all the way down to Maricopa.   
Wallace Morgan prefaced his historical survey of the region by reminding 
us that Kern County should first and foremost be thought of as a place of 
immense pursuit.  It offered cheap land and plenty of it, land ripe with resources 
only in need of toil.  He stated, “Think of such manifest richness as this and 
understand what dreams the pioneers indulged in, what cupidity and greed of 
gain were fostered, what clashes of strong, aggressive, resourceful men the 
scramble to possess these bounties of nature brought about.”1  Of course, writing 
in 1914, Morgan was aware of the fact that these riches were not meant for all, 
they were “locked with locks that golden keys alone could open.”2  Similarly 
                                                
1 Wallace M. Morgan, History of Kern County, California (Madison: Historic Record Company, 
1914), 1. 
2 Morgan, History, 2. 
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Upton Sinclair compared the oil game to heaven, “where many are called and 
few are chosen.”3      
By 1914, the Kern County oil industry had more semblance of competition 
than prior to the breakup of Standard; however, giants still loomed large in the 
market, and they held the “golden keys.”  Standard Oil of California, Union, 
California Petroleum Company, Associated and Pacific Oil Companies and 
others owned and operated the oil fields from Maricopa north to Coalinga.  In 
September of 1921 the oil workers of western Kern County faced a post-war 
economic slump, wage cuts across the board and the increasingly hostile attitude 
of oil operators towards consultation with the federal government on labor 
relations.  On September 10 the oil workers voted to strike. 
1.1 The State of Labor in the Industry 
They did so as members of the International Association of Oil Field, Gas 
Well and Refinery Workers of America, which was granted its union charter from 
the AFL in 1918.  Prior to this oil workers’ unions were comparatively small and 
diffuse.  They were products of the industry’s migratory nature as well as the iron 
grip of Standard Oil.4  Workers would frequently need to move from lease to 
lease due to market fluctuations, overproduction or the discovery of new fields.5   
The “first major strike in oil” was in 1905 outside Beaumont, Texas.  It 
managed to stave off a wage cut, but gained only minor temporary traction for 
                                                
3 Upton Sinclair, Oil! (New York: Penguin Books, 2007), 73. 
4 See Ida Tarbell, The History of the Standard Oil Company (New York: McClure, Phillips & 
Company, 1904). 
5 Nancy Quam-Wickham, “Petroleocrats and Proletarians: Work, Class, and Politics in the 
California Oil Industry, 1917-1925” (PhD diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1994), 65. 
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unionism in the region.6  There was another in 1916 in Bayonne, New Jersey, but 
it ended even worse with nine strikers shot dead and fifty more wounded.7  
Similarly in California, oil strikes and union drives largely floundered right up till 
1917.8  Harvey O'Connor noted that “when a man talked union he was turned 
right out of camp.”9  This changed with the onset of a wartime economy.  
By 1918 and under AFL recognition, Locals sprang up throughout Kern 
County, particularly down the “‘Ridge’ along the western border of the Valley.”10  
Locals also blossomed in Texas and Los Angeles.  These were all capable of 
immense variation in terms of strategy as well as rank and file ideology.  
Whereas the Texas Locals had struck during the war, along with other industries, 
and Long Beach Local 128 had grown a reputation for radicalist sympathies, the 
San Joaquin Valley locals were proud to have not struck during wartime and 
grew increasingly conservative and ingrown.11  The relationship between the Los 
Angeles locals and those of the San Joaquin Valley will be fleshed out in later 
chapters, but it should be noted up front that when the Kern County oil workers 
went on strike in 1921, they did it alone. 
 
                                                
6 Harvey O'Connor, History of Oil Workers International Union-CIO (Denver: Oil Workers 
International Union-CIO, 1950), 4. 
7 Ibid., 2. 
8 Ibid., 9. 
9 O’Connor, History, 9. 
10 These included: Coalinga-Avenal Local 2, Taft Local 6, Kern River Local 19, Lost Hills Local 1, 
Maricopa Local 18, Fellows Local 13 and McKittrick Local 24.  See O’Connor, History of Oil 
Workers, 428-429. 
11 Long Beach Local 128 had strong affiliations with the Longshoremen’s Union dating back to the 
1916 San Pedro Bay strike.  The unionism of this region was broad and encompassed the 
radicalism of the I.W.W. and the idea of cross-industry solidarity.  See John Laslett, Sunshine 
Was Never Enough: Los Angeles Workers 1880-2010 (Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 2010), 79-90. 
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1.2 The Kern County Strike                  
Thousands of workers walked off the fields that fall quickly establishing a 
strike zone, and oil operators beheld the “specter of a workers’ state.”12  Broadly 
speaking, the oil workers movement can be seen as one of the last major strikes 
of 1919-1922 “wave” before labor fell into the “lean years” of the decade.13  
However, it contradicts neat categorization and placement alongside other 
moments of labor unrest.  Quam-Wickham briefly concludes that the union and 
their 1921 strike had “developed a critique of oil’s political economy that involved 
issues far beyond traditional labor concerns.”14   
They did this through abandoning material “shop floor” objectives such as 
reducing wage cuts, demanding union recognition and safer working conditions.  
Instead they called for federal government oversight akin to that which they had 
experienced through the war period.  They articulated a deep faith in the 
government that would not be infused with labor demands until the development 
of the CIO in the 1930s.  This faith arose out of WWI and the Wilsonian era, both 
of which had fundamentally altered the relationship between Americans and the 
federal government.  The sentiment was that if the government had the power to 
                                                
12 Quam-Wickham, “Petroleocrats,” 214. 
13 The common reaction to labor disputes in the immediate postwar period is one of inevitable 
surrender.  None of the strikes during this moment are thought to have had any chance of 
success.  We should be aware of this pitfall.  Not only can this thinking lead to automatically 
lumping all strikes of the era into one homogenous pool, but it can also neglect moments of 
potential success.  David Montgomery articulates that by 1921, “A reformation of trade-union 
policies along the lines advocated by the AFL’s progressive wing might have minimized labor’s 
losses, and it would certainly have left the federation better prepared to take advantage of the 
resurgence of economic activity in 1923.”  See two works by David Montgomery: The Fall of the 
House of Labor: The Workplace, the State, and American Labor Activism, 1865-1925 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 453; "Thinking about American Workers in the 
1920s," International Labor and Working-Class History, no. 32 (1987), 8. 
14 Quam-Wickham, “Petroleocrats,” 2. 
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engage in conscription and demand intense loyalty to the war effort then it should 
also have the ability to support Americans after the war’s conclusion.15   
The Wilson administration heavily supervised the oil industry’s spheres of 
labor relations, public leases and pollution control.16  For oil workers these were 
the good old days now under threat.  Strikers crafted an image of “patriotic 
unionism,” underpinned by a faith in the federal government, but also by the 
conservatism of the American Legion.  The adoption of this ideology was 
unquestionable and an integral part of the strike’s design from the onset.  Strikers 
adorned “badges of red, white and blue,” enforced prohibition and gambling laws, 
disdained radicalism and immigration, and “pinned their faith to Uncle Sam’s 
signature.”17   
The strike had a unique ability to reach beyond immediate economic 
conditions and garner local political support; in that sense it had features more 
akin to a social movement.18  The strike lasted six weeks and paralyzed the state 
oil industry, but ultimately ended in defeat for the oil workers who were left to 
either return to work in Kern County under worse conditions than had existed 





                                                
15 Jennifer Keene, Doughboys, the Great War, and the Remaking of America (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2001), 7-8. 
16 Quam-Wickham, “Petroleocrats,” 123. 
17 Fresno Cooperative Californian, September 24, 1921.   
18 Quam-Wickham, “Petroleocrats,” 16. 
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1.3 The Design of the Strike 
Labor historians such as Lawrence Goodwyn often argue that we ought to 
be wary of fixating on the “condescension of the past.”19  We usually study strikes 
to see what went wrong.  The bulk of the historiography on the 1921 Kern County 
Oil Strike falls into this tendency.  The strike was seen as “ephemeral,” a “dismal 
failure,” and “wrought with saboteurs.”20  These all have varying degrees of 
validity; however, the strike was most hobbled by its own internal principles, how 
the strikers defined themselves and their objectives.  Without looking to 
condescend to the oil workers, it still remains important to properly contextualize 
their movement, and identify why the strike unfolded the way it did.   
The fact that Legionnaires comprised a vast portion of the rank and file 
and were able to overwhelmingly dominate the discourse between strikers, 
operators and the government is crucial.  However, this is not unique, the West 
Virginia Coal Wars months earlier also contained a significant number of veteran 
strikers.  In many ways these two strikes offer an insightful comparative analysis.  
They were underlaid by the seismic shift in industry from coal to petroleum-based 
fuel, they arose out of the post-WWI economic downturn and they were both 
carried out with highly organized military tactics.  These features appear to make 
the two strikes commensurable, however, the nature of the struggles that ensued 
were quite different.   
                                                
19 Lawrence Goodwyn, The Populist Moment: A Short History of the Agrarian Revolt in America 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), XIV. 
20 Whitney Thompson-Tozier, “Armed with Badges of Red, White & Blue: The 1921 California Oil 
Strike and the End of Union Bargaining in ‘The Lean Years’” (M.A. thesis, California State 
University, Fresno, 2013), 3-4. 
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The Coal Mine Strike of 1921 was characterized by WWI veterans on both 
sides of the conflict.  Unlike the situation in Kern County, there existed a local 
social buffer between the strikers and the mine owners. This antagonistic middle 
class throughout Mingo County, West Virginia was composed of lawyers, clerks, 
physicians, clergymen, contractors, car salesmen, bookkeepers, insurance men, 
merchants and American Legionnaires.21  This material shoring up of two 
oppositional forces, along with a multitude of other factors like Appalachian 
company town life, led to an unprecedented level of violence and bloodshed 
throughout the Coal Mine War period.   
Not but a month later, the Kern County Oil Strike would supposedly boast 
an inversion of that picture.  Quam-Wickham noted that by late September 
newspapers were describing it as “the most moral and sober strike ever pulled.”22  
This was a strike of immense peculiarity in terms of who the bulk of the workers 
were and what the nature of their ideology was.  Unlike the Mingo County middle 
class that stood in fierce opposition to strikers, the Kern County Oil strike was 
able to placate the local population to a certain degree.  The strike was so 
comprehensive that it managed to become an active economic and political force 
in the region.  Local businesses and professionals that did not support the strike 
were boycotted and local political offices including the sheriff and district attorney 
were propped up by the union.  Whitney Thompson-Tozier states, “The oil 
workers gave their strike legitimacy by arguing that their message was rooted in 
                                                
21 Lon Savage, Thunder In the Mountains: The West Virginia Mine War, 1920-1921 (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1984), 188. 
22 Quam-Wickham, “Petroleocrats,” 238. 
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patriotism and that their goal was to secure American values in the workplace.”23  
The strike essentially flipped the rhetoric of the red scare on its head.  Instead of 
labor being on the defensive against Americanism, strikers argued that oil 
producers in the region were attempting to reduce the conditions of “red blooded 
American workers” to the level of Russian serfdom and that the producers’ 
rejection of government intermediation was akin to the hostility of the Kaiser 
which they had vehemently fought against in the war. 
1.4 Moving Beyond “Us vs. Them”   
Two primary questions arise: did the unique conservatism of this strike 
and its components benefit or hobble the movement, and how “moral and sober” 
was the strike?24 
                                                
23 Thompson-Tozier, “Armed,” 25. 
24 The term conservatism as a characterization for historical subjects can be problematic.  It often 
holds a rather nebulous meaning, capable of implying free market ideology one moment then 
nationalism the next.  The discourse of American conservatism will be fleshed out in chapter 4 
and will primarily involve historians’ reactions to it as a social force.  The working definition of the 
term for the purposes of this project is couched in the language and beliefs of the American 
Legion.  Coming out of WWI Legionnaires adopted a vision of American nationalism that was 
influenced by Progressivism, the Preparedness Movement and wartime service.  This nationalism 
is what came to be called Americanism as the post-war decade ensued.  The Legion’s 
interpretation was conservative because essentially it did not believe in drastic political or social 
change.  This version of conservatism believed that the American political system was inherently 
fair and equitable, and that it alone was capable of solving societal problems.  So unlike later 
formulations of American conservatism in the post-war period that revolved around limited 
government and free market ideology, the Legion’s conservatism centered around a severe 
loyalty to the federal government.  Christopher Nehls argues that this was a “wartime conception 
of loyalty,” meaning there was no room for other social identities outside that of an American 
citizen, and that the American public was in need of constant policing.  Legionnaires sought to 
police political behavior by ensuring that various other social identities were discouraged and that 
no radical change took place to American institutions.  Nehls argues that Legionnaires tended to 
“define democracy more as a process rather than a set of civil rights or the free debate of political 
ideas.”  Therefore Legionnaires such as those that composed the Kern County Oil Workers 
Movement, did not see policing people as a violation of American rights, but rather a necessary 
measure to ensure the country’s social and political cohesion. 
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By 1919 American Legion members were articulating that the war had 
awoken veterans to a newly forged bond with the American government, one that 
led them to feel as though they were an integral part of the government itself, and 
no longer careless detached citizens.  This newly crafted civic consciousness of 
the ex-servicemen was aiming to redefine American national identity.25  
Americanism, as it came to be called, was never a precise ideology and more 
frequently defined itself in contrast to what it was not.  It stemmed from a belief 
that American democracy had crafted a “common status and identity for all 
citizens based on the equality of opportunity and freedoms they all shared.”26  
This implied that Americans had a responsibility to politically behave in such a 
way as to protect the institutions that granted those freedoms.  
A critical component of this behavior was to reject the impulses of outside 
identities.  Legionnaires denied the legitimacy of class or ethnic consciousness, 
preferring citizens instead think of themselves as “100-percent” Americans with 
single, nationally focused civic identities.”27  Kern County oil workers attempted to 
balance their class identity with their sense of American nationalism, as if both 
were one in the same, that the well-being of American labor was inherent in 
American nationalism.  They hitched their material class desires to ideological 
nationalism and got caught in between its larger transitioning in American 
politics.  
                                                
25 Christopher Courtney Nehls, “‘A Grand and Glorious Feeling:’ The American Legion and 
American Nationalism Between the World Wars” (PhD diss., University of Virginia, Charlottesville, 
2007), 92. 
26 Ibid., 95. 
27 Ibid., 4. 
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Under a growing conservative retreat from progressive era policies, the oil 
workers' economic conditions grew worse through wage cuts and lack of federal 
mediation.  They chose to strike, but did so without fully embracing their class 
identity.  They distanced themselves from radical labor frameworks.  They 
wavered on the issue of nationalization.  They chose not to call for a larger 
statewide strike, chose not to strike the refining positions so as not to damage 
the “Great Pacific Fleet” and ultimately capitulated to every request from the 
Labor Department.  Their faith in the federal government was misplaced by 1921, 
and effectively hobbled the growth of the movement beyond the local level.  They 
were a labor movement out of place, relying solely on government action when 
the Harding administration’s burgeoning atmosphere was one of “less 
government in business.” 
1.5 The Operations of Conservatism  
Historians concerned with the 1921 strike have noted the workers’ 
“patriotic unionism,” but often found it a rather scrupulous component of the 
movement.  The “moral and sober” question is pivotal because it deals with the 
fundamental characteristics of American conservatism that were being 
formulated at this moment by groups such as the American Legion.  This type of 
conservatism was designed to underlay American nationalism.  It was to be 
concerned with citizenry, anti-radicalism, stability of American institutions and 
disregard for other forms of social and political identification.  Technically it was 
also supposed to be about law and order and the pro-Americanization of 
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immigrants.  In reality it was always difficult for this brand of Americanism to 
uphold these values.  These were the values in principle, hardly ever in practise. 
 Kern County oil strikers did not simply employ the rhetoric of the 
American Legion, but also its propensity for violence and racial outlook.  The 
violence is aptly demonstrated in a number of altercations that strike “law and 
order committees” engaged in with potential scabs, bystanders, Wobblies and 
“wets,” and their stance on racial integration was staunchly hostile.  Oil workers’ 
willingness to resort to vigilantism in order to police the civic behavior of the 
community, as well as their intent to shape the demographics of it, reflect their 
embrace of the identity of Americanism. 
Upon the strike’s conclusion and despite the fact that their movement’s 
conservative design and identity had not led to any form of success, there was 
no mass pull to the left on the part of oil workers in the San Joaquin Valley.  On 
the contrary a portion of workers and supporters of the strike turned to the 
nativism of the Klan.  The organization saw a swift rise throughout Kern County 
in early 1922, and offered another version of Americanism: one that did not even 
vaguely believe in integration, had a wider array of scapegoats to choose from 
for society’s ills and had no qualms about engaging in lawlessness to enforce its 
perceived “moral code.” 
1.6 A Conservative Strike 
Despite all of this, the oil workers’ movement should still command a 
certain degree of respect.  The economic conditions they were protesting were 
severe; twelve-hour days spent drenched in oil and beaten down upon by an 
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inescapable heat, all set to a hellish backdrop of “barren brown hills and valleys 
that exhale the ineffable perfume of sulpherated hydrogen.”28  The oil workers 
were reacting against a grim lived reality, in the words of E.P. Thompson, “their 
aspirations were valid in terms of their own experience.”29   
The strikers may have been acting upon conservative values, but they 
were acting none the less, and not as moral patriots or bigoted fanatics, astute 
laborers or blind sheep, family men or violent roughnecks, but as American 
laborers somehow exhibiting all of this against the backdrop of a strike, 
capitalism and a post-war society.  The strike was neither moral nor sober, 
instead it was invariably tense, underpinned by the Legion’s racialized world view 
and penchant for vigilante violence.  The strikers’ movement was built upon 
unstable ideological ground.  Their dire economic situation led them to materially 
organize along class lines, in the form of a strike, but their class identity quickly 
took a backseat and proved secondary to conservative rhetoric and actions that 
placed staunch Americanism first.  The oil workers’ movement and its fallout 
demonstrates that class formations could be severely complicated by identity as 
far back as the 1920s.  It also demonstrates that American conservatism as an 
animating social force will not always operate according to “slow and steady” or 




                                                
28 Philip K. Carnine, "Coalinga and Fresno," Fresno Labor News, September 1, 1919. 




THE BOOM & THE BACKGROUND 
Kern County and the larger San Joaquin Valley acquired the discouraging 
title of “armpit of California” sometime over the past few decades, and to this day 
it can represent a regrettable corridor, one whose arid landscape fills motorists’ 
minds with images of backwardness.30  However, in the 1910s, Kern County was 
an auspicious location for modern development.  Wallace Morgan exclaimed in 
1914, “There is always some big thing doing in Kern County!”  The region’s most 
critical resource was its underground sea of oil.  Morgan challenged his readers 
to “ask the first man you meet in the streets of Bakersfield what gave the town its 
great boost forward about the year 1900, and he is very likely to answer it was 
the discovery of the oil fields.”31  While it is true that the region was also ripe for 
agricultural development, these prospects by the late 19th century were marred 
by battles over water rights and a lack of cheap labor.  Oil alone was Kern 
County’s medium for expressing its modernity.   
The 1910s was not so much a moment of oil discovery in the region, but 
rather a moment of conjunction between existing oil fields, increased market 
opportunities and industrial technologies.32  Oil as a commodity could not simply 
be mined out of rock and sold later that day like the precious metals that filled the 
surrounding mountains of Kern County.  Right up until the late 19th century, oil 
being procured in the region was crude and “asphalt-like.”  This was until James 
                                                
30 Aaron Gilbreath, “Driving the San Joaquin Valley: An Afternoon with Starbucks Customers in 
the Armpit of California,” Harper’s Magazine, April 23, 2015. 
31 Morgan, History, 126. 
32 Ibid., 127. 
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and Jonathan Elwood tapped into an underground sea of oil at the Kern River 
Field in 1899, and the resulting boom funneled people into Kern from all over the 
country.33 
This was followed by the “age of the gushers” commencing in 1910 and 
most aptly exemplified by the Lakeview No. 1 well in western Kern County, which 
erupted like a volcano that spring and rampaged for eighteen months, ultimately 
flooding the surrounding countryside with an estimated nine million barrels of 
oil.34  Oil workers were forced to paddle boats across a black sea in attempts to 
“sandbag” the ferocious gusher.  One after another, wells erupted along the 
western hills of Kern County dissolving the imaginary boundary of its 
underground ocean of oil once thought to only inhabit the areas along the Kern 
River.  Wallace concluded that “it fueled the promises of the wildest of wildcat oil 
promoters and there was a rush of tenderfeet into the oil game.”35 
This growth of Kern County and the booming of the oil fields occurred 
despite the fact that the gushers were driving the price of oil down to an almost 
flat line.  The oil of the region proved too varied in quality, too large in quantity 
and too reliant upon infrastructure to make it to market in any immediate manner.  
After the initial boom of excitement waned through the 1910s, small scale oil 
producers withered under low prices and only the giants such as Union, Standard 
and the Associated Oil Company had enough capital to hold out through 
                                                
33 Morgan, History, 130. 
34 William Rintoul, Oildorado: Boom Times on the Westside (Santa Cruz: Valley Publishers, 
1978), 4-5. 
35 Morgan, History, 144. 
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subprime market conditions.36  Quickly these large oil companies and others 
formed an oligopoly and bought out remaining large tracts of land alongside the 
Southern Pacific Railroad holdings.  Kern County’s line between its capitalists 
and its laborers grew starker as the region flexed its modernity. 
The oil boom drove ensuing advancements in regional agricultural, 
permanent city construction, civic standards and modern sensibilities.37  In 1912 
Western Kern County hosted the Washington’s Birthday Road Race in which 
motorists ripped through the “vulcanized landscape” of the oil fields atop modified 
fifty-horsepower engines and visiting spectators commented on the region’s 
“spirit of enthusiasm and boost that marks the strides of progress.”38  In 1913 the 
newly built C & C Theatre screened Opportunity, a film that depicted a young oil 
worker rising through the ranks of industry against the backdrop the westside oil 
fields, and Bakersfield residents filled the Popular Pastime Theatre in the Spring 
of 1914 to catch a glimpse of The Vitagraph Company’s cinematic production of 
Uncle Tom’s Cabin.39   
Contests of physical fitness and a growing desire for moments of leisure 
permeated the fields of Kern County.  In the fall of 1913 Taft hosted a 20-round 
heavyweight boxing match between Sam Langford and Jack Lester during which 
an accident at the Kern Trading & Oil Company’s No. 21 well caused thousands 
of barrels of flaming oil to shoot up into the air.40  Local newspapers devoted 
                                                
36 Morgan, History, 147. 
37 Ibid., 148. 
38 Rintoul, Oildorado, 17. 
39 Ibid., 37; “Uncle Tom’s Cabin Produced by the Vitagraph Company,” The Bakersfield 
Californian, March 5, 1914. 
40 Rintoul, Oildorado, 71. 
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entire sections of their print to covering local baseball leagues, boxing contests 
and road racing.41  Oil workers were keen to spend their wages on the latest 
spectacle during what little free time they had.  Michael McGerr notes that 
progressivism applauded a “responsible use of leisure,” and sought a “middle 
ground between the idler and the man who works himself to death.”42   
Unfortunately oil workers of California obtained less leisure time than 
laborers in other industries right through the progressive era.  Average 
manufacturing wages had increased through the 1910s and the total number of 
hours worked had slowly decreased, but conditions in the oil industry had 
stagnated.  By 1914 the majority of manufacturing workers in California had 
earned the eight-hour day.43  Meanwhile oil workers slogged through twelve-hour 
days drenched in the product of their labor.  Industrial accidents such as Taft oil 
worker Ed Ernest catching his hand in a derrick catline that ripped off all his 
fingers were an everyday occurrence.44  California oil workers grew increasingly 
aware of their economic precarity and exploitation as the 1910s wore on. 
2.1 The “Tankies” Strike of 1914 
On March 6, 1914, boilermakers of the Standard Oil lease in Wasco went 
on strike in response to company attempts at a stretch-out and began their 
march to the western oil fields in an attempt to stir up other “tankies” in 
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solidarity.45  In the beginning, local reaction to the strike was subdued, distracted 
by “General” Charles Kelly’s unemployed army and their march to Washington 
with plans to join Jacob Coxey’s movement.46  Kelly’s “army” was primarily 
composed of I.W.W. members and was moving east through Sacramento when 
they were bogged down in Yolo County by a posse of local deputies and 
Southern Pacific goons.  Five hours down the California Grapevine Kern County 
residents were anxious of such large-scale aggression.  One editorial exclaimed 
that these “armies” were nothing but “deplorable bums” who should be forced to 
work, and that if communities continued to allow such behavior California would 
soon face a “vexatious question.”47 
Progressive Governor Hiram Johnson refused to aid the “army” in any 
way, but was hesitant to call out the state militia and instead believed that local 
authorities could handle the situation.48  He was still wrangling with the fallout 
from the Wheatland Hop Riot several months before that had resulted in four 
deaths and the paranoia that Wobblie sabotage lurked behind every corner.49  
The “tankies” strike was successful in reaching Taft and calling out fellow 
workers from the fields, however their numbers only ever reached upwards of a 
hundred.  Solidarity took responsibility for the strike’s organization that spring; 
however, local reports indicated that the oil workers shared few affiliations to any 
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organization, much less the I.W.W.50  Dubofsky reminds us that the I.W.W. was 
always quick to claim credit for a strike and even quicker to stoke suspicions of 
how bad things could get.51 
By March 27, the strike was still underway and oil workers were picketing 
the Standard Oil Camp driving away all potential scabs.  Initial reports were 
favorable for the strikers, who claimed they were looking to operate peacefully 
and without disruption to the local communities of the west side fields.52  Some 
local newspapers changed their tune once violence broke out against 
strikebreakers in Taft, claiming that “city officials will take means to relieve the 
community of the menace of this turbulent army!”53  Somewhere amongst all this 
excitement on the westside the 150 “tankies” on strike became an “army,” but 
local residents remained rather unalarmed by their activities.  A Bakersfield 
Californian editorial praised the region’s “red-faced oil men” for their 
contributions, charity and “24-karat hearts of gold.”54  It appeared so long as 
violence was not rampant, strong civic sentiments connected Kern County and its 
oil workers. 
On April 7, the month-long strike had ended in rather anticlimactic fashion.  
Standard Oil workers would receive no end to the company stretch out and no 
increase in wages.  Instead they wound up demanding and receiving the 
dismissal of the oil camp’s Chinese cooks, their immediate replacement with 
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white cooks and a cut in the cost of board.55  Local papers considered the entire 
event frivolous claiming that the oil workers might as well have not gone on strike 
at all given such meager change in outcome, one that could have been settled a 
month ago.56  Standard Oil quickly shook off the temporary lull in production and 
soon after published a report on the state of industry in Kern County which 
detailed unprecedented figures closing in on 300,000 barrels a day.57  Industry 
periodicals exclaimed, “California’s oil fields are a force to be reckoned with!”58 
2.2 Oil and the Progressive Era   
Due to a plateau in constant capital and oil refining technologies by 1915, 
the oil oligopoly that had formed in Kern County was increasingly reliant upon 
sheer production to generate profits crippling the major companies’ capacity for 
labor concessions.59  Kern County oil workers continually struggled to see a 
“square deal,” instead it was more of the same.  On April 18, seven oil workers at 
the Kern Trading & Oil Company fell thirty five feet through the roof of a 
petroleum reservoir before the ensuing timber and heavy equipment came 
crashing down upon their bodies leaving nothing but a crude amalgam of “flesh, 
wood and steel.”60  Not but three days later Kern County hosted its own 
“Homecoming Week,” furnished with the largest parade Bakersfield had ever 
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seen, marching bands, motor races and rodeos.61  Local papers boasted of the 
county’s “steady development and continued progress” and advertised its 
opportunities for the “the home seeker, the capitalist and the wage earner.”62   
This type of irony was not lost on Hiram Johnson who on April 25, facing a 
crowd in Bakersfield, exclaimed to Kern County business owners, “We say to 
you, figure into your business the broken human being, and we will all pay for it, 
just exactly as we pay for your broken machinery!”63  However, Johnson 
consistently failed to poll well in Kern County.  Local editorials claimed the 
progressives were responsible for California’s social upheavals of the past two 
years and that big money surrounded the Bull Moose.64  In 1914 Kern County 
was a democratic stronghold and progressives held little political influence.  In 
fact it was the only county in the state where Socialists out-registered 
Progressives.65  This was all despite the fact that Johnson was the first governor 
to introduce an aggressive state regulatory apparatus in the face of capital.66  
However, it was an apparatus that was young and had the potential for both 
positive and negative impacts on oil workers.  By 1914 progressivism’s political 
economy appeared more interested in curtailing the “wickedly wasteful methods” 
by which oil was produced, and this often meant calls for scientific management 
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which “could both defend and attack workers' status in industry.”67  Oil workers 
living in company tents surrounded by western Kern County sagebrush were 
rightly skeptical and failed to fully embrace government intervention at this 
juncture.  Hofstder’s image of the progressive “everywhere visibly, palpably, 
almost pathetically respectable” was not one likely to be encountered in the 
western oil fields.68  
California’s “age of gushers” may have coincided with the fervor of the 
progressive era, but the state’s oil oligopoly proved too strong and vertically 
integrated to be challenged in any meaningful way until 1917 with the onset of a 
wartime political economy when oil workers themselves would undergo a shift in 
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CHAPTER 3  
“OVER THERE” & “OVER HERE” 
Despite the fact that by 1917 Kern County and the rest of America sat at 
the edge of two decades rife with social and political upheaval, marked by mass 
immigration, unscrupulous concentration of wealth and ubiquitous labor unrest, 
Americans were not ignorant of the war in Europe.  As Christopher Cappazola 
argues, prior to joining the fray, Americans’ “neutrality did not imply apathy.”70  
Instead, Americans developed an unprecedented fascination with world maps as 
they eagerly traced the events of war and pinpointed places such as Seriavo and 
Gallipoli.   
Americans at this time, particularly within the western border states, were 
also highly aware of actions connected to the Mexican Revolution which they did 
not see as separate from the events of the war in Europe.71  Kern County 
newspapers touted front page headlines concerning the movements of Carranza, 
Huerta and Villa.72  Capozzola rightly contends that historians have not done 
enough to incorporate the Mexican Revolution into an American understanding of 
WWI, however this transnationalism can be stretched even further to also 
integrate Americans’ understanding of radicalism.  Through various radical 
permutations Mexicans and Americans were in a constant binational flux with 
one another, spreading ideas and information, organizing strikes and forays into 
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social movements.73  Kern County, a mere 250 miles from the border, was a 
geographical node for agricultural and industrial laborers, a region ripe for the 
intersection of radicals from both nations.  Wobblies even boasted to have 
“expropriated” horses from Hearst Ranch to aid Mexican revolutionaries.74  
Ultimately Americans, including those of Kern County, felt increasingly connected 
to world events and were not taken by surprise when the vacuum-like presence 
of WWI began pulling their country into the conflict. 
Woodrow Wilson initially urged Americans to be “impartial in thought as 
well as in action.”75  A tall order for Wilson himself whose 1916 campaign slogan 
read “he kept us out of the war,” but who privately mused that “the German 
philosophy was essentially selfish and lacking in spirituality,” and that “England is 
fighting our fight.”76  He was not alone through the neutrality period.  Americans 
as a whole were grappling with the “German mind,” particularly the higher 
criticism of German theology that perceived scripture as mere metaphor, which 
was hostile and barbaric enough before being amalgamated with German U-boat 
activities.77   
These activities had briefly subsided after the initial shock of the Lusitania 
in 1915, but were resumed by early 1917 when Germany took the gamble to 
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mount one final offensive.78  With Russia rumbling in internal revolution and 
French morale dwindling, Germany reignited submarine belligerence seeking to 
“knock Britain out by starvation before the United States could bring her force to 
bear; a gamble that almost succeeded in the summer of 1917.”79   
Wilson sat on the eve of approaching Congress for a declaration of war 
acutely aware of what it implied.  Frank Cobb of the New York World visited him 
that night where Wilson argued, “lead this people into war and they’ll forget there 
ever was such a thing as tolerance.”80  The atmosphere in America that spring 
was increasingly tense.  Anti-war sentiments from the socialist and populist wings 
withered under shouts of treason.  David Kennedy notes, “There seemed indeed 
to be something inexorable in the air, some sucking wind from across the 
Atlantic, drawing the United States into the vortex of the gruesome conflict.”81  
America’s door into a world of fear and hysteria was creaking open. 
3.1 Preparedness and Perceived Dissent  
First progressivism itself needed to abandon its apprehensions and bend 
its principles to accommodate war.  Thoughtful men and women had to subvert 
the American isolationist claim or the “ancient rule” by arguing that they were not 
going to fight Europeans, but rather what Europe meant to the American mind.  
The war was recast from calamity to crusade.  A crusade against Old World 
barbarism, essentially coercive and therefore fundamentally un-American.  As 
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Kennedy states, “America was going to war against the past.”82  Intellectuals of 
the progressive movement like John Dewey argued that Germany must be 
crushed so that “social possibilities” can arise and progressive ideals can truly 
flourish.83  Americans’ accommodation of war enabled them to extract the 
possibilities of pushing liberalism, education and progress to utopian levels.  
They began to believe that “war was the forge in whose fires they might shape a 
new ethos of social duty and civic responsibility.”84 
Of course, right beneath the surface of progressivism’s ideals was a 
growing sense of American nationalism and the heightened awareness of 
“others” that fell outside its perceived parameters.  If the old world was barbaric, 
among its worst inhabitants were the savage Huns.  Wilson aided in painting this 
portrait when in 1915 he warned of disloyalty from the “millions of men and 
women of German birth and native sympathy who live among us,” to which the 
crowd rumbled in applause.85  Anti-German sentiment rapidly grew ferocious, it 
came to sanction state restrictions on teaching the German language, if not 
attempts to fully outlaw it, as well as massive restrictions on the German press.86  
It initiated dozens of “patriotic organizations” often filled with nativists not only 
looking to spread the gospel of 100% Americanism, but dole out vigilante 
punishment to “hyphenated” Americans.   
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Capozzola argues that Americans in this period walked a fine line between 
vigilance and vigilantism.87  On the one hand vigilant American citizens were 
organizing themselves into civic groups such as the YMCA and the Salvation 
Army, and were acting upon “long standing traditions equating citizenship with 
obligation.”88  On the other hand vigilante groups engaged in physical violence 
and murder by reorienting “the place of law in the system of political obligation.”89  
The growing nationalist sentiment may have stood on a shared ideological 
ground of citizenship, civic duty and Americanism, but within those categories 
Americans brought their own definitions and prescriptions to bear. 
The “war for the American mind” also possessed “top down” components.  
In 1917 Wilson appointed former muckraker George Creel to head the 
Committee on Public Information which also came to walk a fine line, one 
between an appeal to America’s tradition of consensus and crude propaganda.  
As America’s involvement in the war increased, so did the institution’s calls for 
“accelerated Americanization.”  Kennedy notes, “the overbearing concern for 
‘correct’ opinion, for expression, for language itself and the creation of an 
enormous propaganda apparatus to nurture the desired state of mind and 
excoriate all dissenters” was strikingly Orwellian.90 
However, 100% Americanism was never solely looking to confront 
German people themselves, it was also compelled to eradicate the political 
impulses of German thought.  An early formation of American national 
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“character” began formulating itself.  Duncan Moench argues that, “it joined 
notions of Anglo ethnicity with concepts of liberal political thought and excluded 
Americans of German origin and the ‘deviant’ nonliberal thought their 
communities were seen as favoring.”91  These “deviant” forms of political thought 
were never well articulated.  As with much of the Americanism that developed 
during this period, it often defined itself by what it was not.92 
Writing for the Nation, Fredrick Lewis Allen argued, “The only way to fight 
Prussianism is with Prussian tools.  The danger is lest we forget the lesson of 
Prussianism: that the bad brother of discipline is tyranny.”93  100% Americanism 
was a frequently confused ideology, but it approximated danger as being 
somewhere in between the German state, barbaric German culture and Germans 
themselves.94  One Bakersfield Californian editorial in 1917 read, 
Germany is an idea.  The modern German has been so insistently and 
methodically taught that he is a superman, chosen by God to impose his 
will on the heart, he never doubts it.  The German Socialist is no 
exception.  There is only one way to reach the modern German.  Beat him 
over the head!  He understands nothing else.  The world must go on 
beating him over the head until he says ‘enough’ otherwise the world can 
never live with him.95   
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Moench points out that the “deviant” political traditions of Germans or 
other perceived enemies could be any “socialist, anarchist, or social democratic 
political thought outside the Anglo-American liberal norm.”96  The American 
Socialist Party had grown at a steady pace through the 1910s and by 1917 it 
stood tall as the largest bastion of organized anti-war sentiment in the country.  
Prior to the violent reflex action of Wilson’s America, the Socialist Party’s 
presence held a comfortable ubiquity.  It had gained 6 percent of the presidential 
vote in 1912, won hundreds of political appointments across the country and 
distributed some of the most commonly read and vibrant press of the era.97  The 
Party’s presence in Kern County was just as strong, where socialists out 
registered progressives by the thousands, town libraries of the west side were 
filled with Socialist literature and mass meetings were held on a monthly basis.98  
In early 1917 Samuel Gompers and the AFL struggled to reflect a unified 
opinion of the rank and file regarding the war.99  The Socialist Party seemed 
poised to gain ground among American workers wary of belligerence.  It took a 
joint effort between Gompers and the Wilson administration to entice workers 
with the opportunities of wartime mobilization and at the same time denounce 
opposition to the war.100  The Espionage Act, imposed that June, proved to be an 
unscrupulous tool for stamping out American socialist sentiment and other labor 
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radicalism such as the I.W.W.  It enabled decimation of the radical labor press 
and the ability to throw “persons obstructing military operations during wartime” 
into twenty-year prison sentences.101  Radical labor organizations in America 
were perceived as engaged in both. 
Kern County editorials warned of the “misguided efforts” of the People’s 
Council of America and other anti-war contingents while boosting that, “the 
steady unswerving spirit and clear discerning mind of the American people will be 
untroubled by the machinations of the enemy and his allies in the United 
states.”102  The preparedness movement sought the formation of a deep social 
compact between Americans and the state propped up by “loyalty,” “pep” and 
“the spirit of service.”  These notions were not only intended to compel 
Americans to dutifully accept the war, but also to conceive of their role as 
altruistic and oblige them to “serve a sphere wider than their own.”103  One Kern 
County editorial exclaimed “idleness ought not be tolerated...men ought to find 
some useful occupation now, in time of need, and if they do not then Uncle Sam 
should find it for them!”104   
Nothing revealed the seismic shifts in American society at this moment 
like conscription.  It established a deep social contract between soldiers and the 
federal government based on accepting the legitimate authority of the state and 
its ability to profoundly affect soldiers' lives.105  Kennedy states, “the central 
problem of the age was somehow to substitute an ethos of cooperative 
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nationalism for the obsolescent credo of narrow self-interest.”106  This passage of 
American society from scattered individualism to collective nationalism was best 
described by Herbert Croly who saw it as an application of “Hamiltonian means 
to Jeffersonian ends.”  Americans were increasingly called upon to define 
themselves as part of a larger whole through action.  Capozzola states, “When 
Uncle Sam jabbed his finger at the American public he pointed out their 
rights...who was or was not an American...but mostly he pointed at people 
because he wanted them to do something.”107  The people of Kern County 
proved eager to oblige him.    
State newspapers boasted headlines such as “Kern far exceeds draft 
quota” and “Kern after draft record!” all commending Kern County’s rather high 
enlistment and draft numbers.108  Americans’ sense of duty, sacrifice and 
obligation were felt as strongly in Kern County as anywhere else.  City and 
county authorities rounded up “slackers and evaders” by the truck-load dumping 
them out in the desert or throwing them jail for “disloyalty.”109  Capozolla states 
that in the mind of the dutiful American, “slackers were not just bad citizens, but 
inadequate men.”110  Kern County residents boasted that even if victory of the 
war “over there” remains uncertain, the “war at home” against slackers, socialists 
and all other varieties of “inadequate men” will be decisively won.111  Everyday 
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Americans from the bottom up were converging with the Wilson-Creel 
propaganda from the top, meeting in the middle and crafting an atmosphere 
where it was “dangerous to be disrespectful.”112 
3.2 A New Kind of Capitalism 
America’s political economy was rapidly shifting under Wilson who 
increasingly believed that American ideals of individualism, opportunity and 
competition required the state to act.113  David Montgomery argues, “mobilization 
of the economy for war production locked the administrative structures of 
business and government tightly together, while full employment augmented 
workers’ ability to win strikes and improve their terms of employment.”114  Labor 
unions quickly held the upper hand against employers who were forced to 
concede to state-coordinated planning and management.  A shrill nightmare in 
the mind of a Gilded Age capitalist; prices and production levels were set, labor 
disputes were mediated through the National War Labor Board and industries 
crucial to the war effort were either nationalized or threatened by nationalization.   
Labor rank and file had finally gotten a taste of power and were eager to 
flex their abilities through the war period.  Despite the three-pronged calls from 
business, government and the AFL to be patriotic and halt wartime striking, large-
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scale strikes boomed between 1916 and 1918.115  Workers’ material conditions 
had improved immensely, but their ideas concerning the workplace had also 
begun to flourish as they experimented with increasingly democratic forms of 
shop-floor production and sought to challenge the scientific management of the 
age.116 
3.3 Kern County Oil Workers Unionize  
Kern County oil workers began their campaigns for unionization in the 
spring of 1917 and a year later were granted union charters, through the AFL, for 
locals throughout the Kern County oil fields under the recognition International 
Association of Oil Field, Gas Well and Refinery Workers of America.117  However, 
unlike the unions in the timber or copper industry that hamstrung wartime 
production with massive strikes, the Oil Workers Union was conceived as an 
organization that sought only to operate "along the most conservative and best 
proven lines of labor unionism."118  It sought the “bread and butter” basics of 
shorter days, better wages and improved working conditions.   
No matter how conservative and patriotic the Oil Workers Union set out to 
be, oil operators took every chance they got to slander, harass or threaten them 
after their AFL charter was approved and thousands of Kern County workers had 
joined.  Oil operators roped popular news outlets such as the Los Angeles Times 
into portraying the Oil Workers Union as wrought with Wobbly influence and in 
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league with agents of the Kaiser.119  The union struggled to maintain solidarity 
under the conservative ideology that sought “industrial peace” and claimed to 
have no desire to disadvantage the oil operators.  Oil workers still slogged 
through the twelve-hour day at low wages, while unions in most other industries 
had already won the eight-hour day.  A strong contingent of the rank and file 
within the Oil Workers Union wanted to strike. 
Walter Yarrow joined the Oil Workers Union in 1917 becoming their official 
spokesperson and chief strategist.  He was a Scottish immigrant and self-
proclaimed “oil geologist” who had been living in the Devil’s Den region of Kern 
County for several years prior to the war.120  His interest in the Oil Workers Union 
appears to have been genuine as he frequently lectured throughout Kern County 
on the principles of cooperative social movements.  Industry periodicals argued 
that Yarrow was the single man responsible for the California oil industry 
unionizing movement, highly educated and a “socialist of extremely radical 
tendency.”121  However, by 1917 he joined the Oil Workers Union under the 
premise that it could achieve its goals through conservative union practises and 
that Wilsonian America was all that was needed to better the lives of oil workers.   
Yarrow placated rank and file desires to strike in 1917 and incessantly 
worked toward federal mediation.  He exuded an unshakable faith in the 
government stating, “Our men will not quit work and they will bring to justice any 
member or nonmember who shall interfere with the greatest oil output in this 
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national crisis...we will appeal our cause to those in charge of the nation’s affairs 
and this stand of the 10,000 oil workers now members of the union will mark a 
new era in industrial movements.”122  By winter the strategy had paid off despite 
fierce resistance from oil operators.  Federal mediators resorted to threatening 
nationalization of the oil industry before operators caved under the premise that it 
was a wartime stipulation and the “American thing to do.”123  Kern County oil 
workers had finally secured the chance to indulge in the conditions of a wartime 
political economy.    
3.4 Oil Workers and the Implosion of Progressivism  
Kern County oil workers had won and their conservative ideology worked 
to craft a political atmosphere in the region that locked together unionism and 
strong civic nationalism.  Between 1918 and 1921 the union flexed its political 
power to great success and elected pro-union officials to the offices of sheriff, 
state assembly and district attorney.124  On the state and local level the oil 
workers vote grew to be courted due to their strong union solidarity.   
Through this period Yarrow was also making the Oil Workers Union 
presence felt on the national level.  He met with Labor Secretary Daniels in 
spring of 1918 and argued, in a rather indirect manner, that the federal 
government ought to have faith in the relationship between itself and California 
oil workers, and that such workers were up to the task of operating government 
leases without the meddling presence of the oil companies.125  Yarrow never 
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used the word “nationalization” at this meeting, instead he argued that, “Union 
men are immediately available for your service, ready and eager to perform their 
patriotic duty.”126  Despite Yarrow’s tenderfeet at this moment, nationalization of 
the industry was on the minds of many in Kern County as was the formation of a 
labor party.  Montgomery reminds us that labor’s demands and ideas grew 
exponentially through the war period, but by 1921 had become too intoxicating 
for the AFL to recognize and too threatening for business and the state to 
indulge.127 
The red scare leading up to 1921 provided ample opportunity for American 
conservatism, embodied by veterans’ organizations, the federal government and 
of course business, to equivocate that the entire labor movement paralleled 
Bolshevism.128  This was demonstrated throughout 1919 by an immense wave of 
hysteria and violence that swept across the country.  What was once a rhetoric of 
fear grounded in German aggression was quickly becoming one anchored to the 
Bolshevik Revolution.  Strikes from Boston to Seattle were portrayed and 
handled as acts of political sedition as opposed to ones for economic 
demands.129  Race riots broke out from Chicago to Bisbee fueled by fear of 
Bolshevik attempts to subsume and weaponize black Americans.130   
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Robert Murray argues, “In 1919 America’s soul was in danger...primarily 
because it was deserting its most honored principles of freedom.”131  There was 
a growing sentiment that the war effort, conjoined with all its anti-liberal 
instruments, had drained America of its capacity to act in accordance with 
progressive idealism.  Murray continues, “it was a spiritual fatigue, involving a 
lack of moral stamina, of faith in the principles of democracy, of wisdom and of 
effective leadership.”132  Progressivism was imploding by 1919, it had forced 
Americans to bend their values in acceptance of a war that had led to military 
belligerence, restrictions on free speech, unfathomable death tolls, social 
revolutions and famine.133  In 1920, a retrospective George Creel stated, “I am 
not sure that if the war had to come, it did not come at the right time for the 
preservation and reinterpretation of American ideals.”134  Unions and labor at 
large, integral components of Progressivism’s social utopia, were quickly being 
hung out to dry. 
The election of 1920 ushered in a Republican cohort that had been waiting 
in the wings of American politics, strategically watching as Wilsonianism grew 
unwieldy.  In 1917, Republicans such as Henry Cabot Lodge were able to 
posture with an aggressive attitude towards scattered Democrats and pacifist 
progressive Republicans, all while supporting Americanism and the war effort.  
The war itself had become a political opportunity.  Kennedy states, “Lodge lost 
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no chance to use war issues both to discipline his own party and to needle the 
democrats.”135  The Republican position was designed to have a “clean record of 
anti-hun imperialistic patriotism” coupled with criticism of Wilson’s autocratic and 
overreaching state.136  Republicans were no fans of radicalism, as Coolidge 
demonstrated in Boston, but their position favored the idea of preserving 
American liberties from a bloated and belligerent federal government. 
Harding’s vague “return to normalcy” campaign offered more critiques of 
progressivism than ideas for a future America.  However, the underlying tectonic 
shift was clearly one that pointed backwards.  A plunge back into scattered 
individualism increasingly supplemented by the comforts and spectacles of a 
modern era.137  Walter Lippmann articulated that American society had turned 
out not to be composed of rational actors like the ideals of progressivism had 
suggested, but rather a society of simpletons “whose lives are a morass of 
entanglements and whose vitality is exhausted.”138  The vibrancy of democracy 
contained within the ethos of the progressive era had increasingly become an 
obscure memory, and strides made by the American working class were soon to 
be backpedaled into a state of amnesia.  When Harding exclaimed, “The group 
must not endanger the individual,” he not only had the government in mind, but 
organized labor.139   
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1920s America has long been shrouded in images of glitz, ranging from 
jazz and flapper girls to automobiles and athletic superstars.  Popular historical 
programs play no small part in generating the consensus that the decade was 
either “roaring,” “booming” or “burgeoning.”140  However, for American workers 
the glitz was firmly underlaid by economic precarity.  Mass migration from rural 
communities to urban centers created a seemingly abundant labor pool for 
employers to pick from and put constant downward pressure on wages.  
Immigration restriction after 1924 meant less upward mobility for American 
workers, and mechanization on the shop floor was pursued with unprecedented 
vigor.  What Irving Bernstein called “the march of the machines” implied that 
labor in the 1920s had become highly vulnerable to seasonal work, lay-offs and 
displacement.141  These conditions were all prefigured by the post-war slump and 
vigorous open-shop movement that marked the decade’s inception. 
The post-war economic slump did not rock the oil industry as violently as it 
did other sectors, however its presence was still felt.  The California State Mining 
Bureau noted that production by 1921 was at an unprecedented high, but 
consumption was dragging behind under post-war conditions.  Millions of barrels 
were going unused sitting in storage containers due to “overproduction, general 
industrial depression and sympathetic adjustment to slumps in eastern oil 
fields.”142  However, these conditions in the industry should not be confused for 
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causality.  Oil operators in the San Joaquin Valley were eager to pursue a return 
to pre-war labor conditions regardless of the market atmosphere. 
Oil operators were among the first giants of industry to extract themselves 
from the political economic relationship of wartime America.  In September 1921 
they announced a $1-a-day wage cut across the board and threatened a return 
to the twelve-hour day.143  Oil operators declared that federal mediation had been 
a grave blunder, and that such conditions would not be allowed to persist in 
peacetime.  They claimed that actions taken by the federal government had been 
fundamentally hostile to the notion of economic liberty, and furthermore had 
made oil workers apathetic, knowing the government would secure their 
employment no matter what.144    
The Oil Workers Union deliberated the first two weeks of September 
before voting to strike on September 12.  The volcano, rife with workers 
resentment and angst, had finally erupted.  While local newspapers cried, “Oil 
Industry Paralyzed!” union officials stressed the critical nature of labor relations in 
the oil fields, and argued that “oil workers have gone on strike because they 
could see no other course to take.”145  With wage cuts, threats to return the 
twelve-hour day, blatant disregard for federal mediation and the discharge of any 
worker involved in union activity, it was as if the oil operators had taken upon 
themselves a crusade, the objective of which was clearly to decimate the 
industrial power labor had struggled to gain.   
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CHAPTER 4  
HISTORIOGRAPHY IN THE OIL FIELDS 
In a way, the first work to examine conditions in the California oil fields 
was Upton Sinclair’s 1927 Oil!  He painted lush descriptions of spewing oil rigs 
from which streams would, “hit the ground, bounce up, and explode...and every 
jet that struck the ground turned into a volcano, and rose again, higher than 
before; the whole mass, boiling and bursting, became a river of fire, a lava flood 
that went streaming down the valley.”146  Sinclair wore his sympathies on his 
sleeve, and saw the relationship between oil workers and operators as one 
defined by stark class conflict.  Oil operators’ “frail human nature was subjected 
to a strain greater than it was made for; the fires of greed had been lighted in 
their hearts, and fanned to a white heat that melted every principle and every 
law.”147  Despite Sinclair’s work, labor relations in the California oil fields 
remained a relatively neglected field for historians right through the 20th century. 
Gerald Nash, Herbert Gutman and Patricia Limerick all recognized that 
labor relations in the oil industry had largely been neglected right through the 
1980s despite the work of “new labor historians.”148  Case studies of textile mills, 
steel factories and coal mines were favored over the oil fields of California.149  
Popular historical programs have overwhelmingly focused on Standard Oil and 
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the Rockefellers, shrouding our understanding of the industry in hazy images of 
crude oil rigs stacked upon each other and scattered throughout Appalachia.150   
Harvey O'Connor, the radical journalist who had covered the Seattle 
General Strike of 1919, also looked at the 1921 California Oil Workers’ Strike.  
He took note of the strike’s resourcefulness and solidarity throughout Kern, 
Fresno and Santa Barbara counties.151  O’Connor primarily argues that the strike 
was an inevitable loss “against the stone wall of Standard Oil and the other 
majors,” and that the valorous effort was out of touch with the new atmosphere of 
Harding’s America.152  However, he says nothing of the strike’s conservative 
design, and instead contends that the oil workers nakedly embraced union loyalty 
above all else.153 
Nancy Quam-Wickham was the first to describe the conservative culture 
of the oil workers and indicate that they were attempting to articulate a political 
economic identity that reached beyond the crude racism of Asian exclusion.154  
Make no mistake, the oil workers never lost that aspect of their identity; they 
merely tried to supplement it with a hybrid of American nationalism and labor 
unionism.  Quam-Wickham ultimately argues that the Oil Workers Strike was 
“ephemeral,” cut off from the powerful nodes of labor activism in Los Angeles and 
therefore drained of resources.155  However, she is also the only one in the 
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historiography to subtly suggest that the oil worker’s conservatism hobbled the 
strike’s alternatives.156 
Whitney Thompson-Tozier contrarily argued in her 2013 thesis that the 
strike was in fact amply supplied with resources coming from oil workers in 
solidarity and merchants in both Kern and Santa Barbara counties.157  She 
argues that if it were not for these resources, local support and the patriotic 
unionism that oil workers espoused the 1921 strike would have ended much 
sooner.158  For Thompson-Tozier the striker’s identity did nothing but grant them 
opportunities and support, it truly was the “most moral and sober strike ever 
pulled.”159 
 No historian that has looked at this strike has neglected the political 
atmosphere in which the strikers found themselves.  Harding’s “return to 
normalcy” was clearly a euphemism for returning labor back to a Gilded Age 
state of frailty.  Particularly in the wake of the West Virginia Coal Wars, it is easy 
to dismiss the California Oil Workers’ Strike of 1921 as merely another labor 
defeat in a long line of suppression.  However, this thinking tells us nothing about 
the ways in which a strike can be designed and much less about the ways in 
which labor intersects with the broader discourse of identity.  The old “us” vs. 
“them” in labor history is precisely what is out of date in a modern age where 
organized labor is just as weak as it was in the 1920s (if not weaker) and workers 
tenaciously cling to various identities outside of class.  The 1921 California Oil 
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Workers’ Strike is much more than a heroic class struggle between good and 
evil, us and them; it is about workers attempting to balance class and national 
identities amidst conflict, the implications behind both and the ideological crisis 
that can ensue when material conditions deteriorate beyond recognition.   
4.1 The Conservative Design 
Kern County oil workers built their movement upon conservative values 
from the onset.  Ex-servicemen oil workers filled the ranks of “Law and Order 
Committees,” that claimed not to be picketing but rather keeping the peace and 
protecting private property.160  On the local level committees worked quickly to 
dispel any connection between a labor strike and anarchy.  They maneuvered in 
unison with local law enforcement, “closed all illicit refreshment establishments 
and other questionable amusement resorts operating in the fields” and moved to 
“keep physical violence and loud talk off the streets.”161  Early on the movement 
sought to embed their cause within the daily and moral operations of the region. 
The vast popular perception of oil workers depicted them as loners and 
violent roughnecks, later extensions of the frontier myth and the cowboy ethos.162  
However, this was hardly the case in Kern County, where over 80% of residents 
including oil workers lived with their families.163  Two days into the strike, 
thousands of oil workers and their families paraded down the streets of Taft, 
furnished with American flags, union badges and a strong sense of their 
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movement’s righteousness.164  The early days of the strike were imbued with a 
pervasive festival atmosphere, as union leadership diligently worked to craft its 
political face. 
Demonstrating that the strike was composed of families lent the 
movement a large degree of local support.  Certain businesses donated funds to 
the Oil Workers Relief Fund and others lowered prices in solidarity.  Local papers 
claimed the early days of the strike found merchants with “business as usual.”165   
Women’s roles in the strike are nearly impossible to ignore.  They 
boycotted unsupportive merchants, reinforced picket lines, established child care 
services, catered massive union meetings, distributed strike information and 
visited the homes of potential scabs in attempts to dissuade them.166  Women 
were also formed into auxiliary units of the “Law and Order Committees,” 
patrolling oil fields and engaging in road blocks.  Local papers published the first 
pictures of the strike on September 23, and featured a picture of three women on 
patrol, dressed in uniform and adorning their union badges, as the caption read, 
“Who wouldn’t stop?”167 
By this time oil operators had consolidated themselves within the 
California Oil Producers’ Association and were vigorously opposed to the strike 
and all its demands, which by this point had been whittled down to government 
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mediation.  Union officials stated, “We have accepted a dollar a day reduction.  
We have accepted the open shop.  All we ask is that oil operators sign an 
agreement with the federal government.”168  Strikers saw the rejection of this last 
demand as a “violation of patriotism,” and they were willing to stake their 
movement on it.  The strike’s conservative design was embodied by 
demographics, insistence on “law and order” and strong linkages to the local 
community, but perhaps most strongly by the rhetoric the oil workers chose to 
wrap themselves in.  
The overwhelming majority of oil workers that were funneled into the “Law 
and Order Committees” were also members of the American Legion.  Vice 
President of the Oil Workers Union, R.H. Fraser, boasted “there never was a 
more peaceful strike conducted anywhere,” and praised the Legionnaire's 
conduct.169  The presence of thousands of American Legion members allowed 
the union to tap into and legitimize the language of Americanism.  They 
successfully depicted the oil operators as undemocratic and “defiant of law and 
order government,” and reignited the old Wilsonian dialogue of loyalty.170  
Strikers saw the rejection of federal mediation as a disloyal act of aggression on 
the part of oil operators, who they blatantly called “the real conspirators against 
the American Government.”171   
The union sent telegram after telegram to Secretary of Labor James Davis 
exclaiming that, “An un-American condition exists in the California oil fields, part 
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of the USA, because we citizens of America dare to request that the signature of 
our government be placed on an agreement.”172  More dramatically, Legionnaires 
also began paralleling their current conditions to what they saw during wartime.  
One telegram to the Labor Department declared, “We feel as though under the 
yoke of a thousand czars!”173  Their conception of European evil, one that 
reinforced their patriotism and shaped their language throughout the strike was 
always somewhat vague.  To them the Oil Producers Association represented 
some amalgam of the Kaiser and Prussianism as well as the Russian Czar and 
serfdom.   
The rhetoric was effective, it gave the oil workers’ movement the moral 
high ground and baffled the oil operators who struggled to hurl similar 
accusations back at the strikers.174  As the rhetoric of the Legion increasingly 
dominated the strike, the language of class began to fall by the wayside.  In 
another telegram to the Labor Department on October 5 oil workers argued, 
Allow us the privilege of presenting the case of the workmen in the oil 
industry not as employee to employer, but as one good citizen to another.  
For we are Americans.  Not men unable to speak the language of the 
county, not men fooled into the folly of sovietism, bolshevism, I.W.W.ism, 
or some other ism by foreign agitators from some crowded corner of 
Europe.  With few exceptions we are the men whose fathers...made 
America.175      
 
The conservative design of the oil workers’ strike was deeply rooted in the 
Americanism of the Wilsonian period.  Kern County oil workers were proud that 
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they did not strike during the war as many other unions had and saw themselves 
as defenders of American institutions and ideals.176  They claimed, “Because of 
our service we have an abiding faith in the power and strength of our government 
in its ability to deal impartially and justly.”177  By October it became clear that the 
oil workers' movement was fully hitching its identity to the conservative dialogue 
of Americanism and civic engagement.  They had moved away from the 
language of class conflict and instead they had embraced a dialogue that sought 
to place operators, producers and community members on the same playing 
field, where class distinctions and identity evaporated in the face of American 
civic identity and appropriate behavior.  
4.2 Historiography on the Legion 
Historical research into the American Legion was rather slim right into the 
1990s and often held a congratulatory tone.178  It lacked any critical analysis of 
how the Legion attempted to craft a sense of American nationalism beginning in 
the 1920s.  In this vein, Christopher Nehls’s more recent work on the Legion is 
exceptionally revealing.  He contends that studying the American Legion is a way 
of injecting “social and cultural components into the broader intellectual search 
for the political and civic meaning of American national identity.”179  This 
intellectual endeavor can frequently feel precarious, however, neglecting it 
entirely closes us off from potential tools that could help elucidate the broader 
ways in which labor and identity intersect. 
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  In the 1950s and 1960s there were “consensus” attempts at intellectual 
history that sought to explain why America’s national identity looked the way it 
did.  Perhaps the most famous was Louis Hartz and his work The Liberal 
Tradition in America.  He argued that Americans were inherently “Lockean” or 
“born equal,” that they did not have a feudal past, with all its notions of 
hierarchical power, and therefore democratic capitalism was more or less a 
foregone conclusion.180  Americans were simply built for it.   
 Richard Hofstader had similarly argued years prior that Americans 
seemed eerily content with their “rudderless and demoralized state of 
liberalism.”181  One that included an unfortunate tradition of private property 
defense, economic individualism and competition.  He argued that even our 
frequent and blaring pronouncements for democracy had usually been for a 
“democracy in cupidity rather than a democracy of fraternity.”182  Hofstadter and 
Hartz were both labeled “consensus” historians despite the fact that they were 
both disgruntled by what that consensus was; that Americans were a group of 
people complacently looking backwards and rejecting social change. 
 Critiques of the American nationalist discourse pivoted by the 1990s to 
reflect a more “bottom up” approach, and looked to account for how the factors of 
race, gender and ethnicity shaped American nationalism.183  Nehls argues that 
the American Legion engaged the discourse on a civic level, and developed 
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programs such as “youth sports, Get-Out-the-Vote drives and Boys and Girls 
State, all concentrated on teaching Americans to respect the process of 
American democracy as a way to ensure the survival of the nation’s exceptional 
and defining institutions.”184  Of course, the Legion also preached and heavily 
enforced the anti-radicalism of the Wilsonian era.  The American Legion may not 
have always known exactly what it was, but it certainly knew what it was not, and 
that was radical. 
The Legion’s conservatism is critical to understanding its relationship with 
labor.  Nehls argues that it  
sprung from the narrowly-defined set of civic behaviors it expected from all 
citizens. It demanded that citizens behave with disinterest in civic and 
political life, acting for what was in the best interest of the nation first 
rather than of particular class, ethnic, or racial affiliations. In fact, 
Legionnaires denied the legitimacy of class or ethnic consciousness, 
preferring citizens instead think of themselves as “100-percent” Americans 
with single, nationally focused civic identities.185 
  
Furthermore, Nehls argues that this conservative “colorblind” and “classless” 
notion of citizenship is one that predates Cold War interpretations and ripples 
right through the 21st century.186 
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The American nationalism espoused by the Legion was an 
overwhelmingly conservative force.  Nehls places his analysis of the American 
Legion alongside other scholarship of the 1990s and 2000s that seeks to 
understand American conservatism as more than a panic-stricken state of 
mind.187  Instead this scholarship sought to take conservatism quite seriously.  
Alan Brinkley saw that global cosmopolitanism of the late 20th century not only 
failed to eliminate, but “in many ways increased, the cultural chasms separating 
different groups of Americans from each other.”188  This interpretation implied 
that conservative Americans had to be accepted as “rational, stable and 
intelligent people” who simply rejected the ideas and values of global secular 
liberalism.189  
Nehls’s work on the American Legion fits snugly into this perspective.  He 
argues that Legionnaires’ conservatism may have led them to violent extremes 
when it came to policing labor radicalism, but they did not do this out of fear of 
losing social status.190  Instead, the American Legion’s “reaction to radicalism 
and immigration in the interwar period related directly to its concern about the 
decline of American democratic exceptionalism, not of themselves.”191  Nehls 
recognizes the Legion’s racial and violent tendencies, however he maintains that 
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these were not displays of a “nativist streak,” but rather genuine expressions of 
national identity.192 
Thompson-Tozier places the behavior of Legionnaires in Kern County 
alongside this sentiment.  She argues that, “This strike, made up in a large part 
by WWI veterans was a continuation of their fight for the American dream.”193  In 
her analysis the Americanism invoked by strikers holds a rather virtuous position.  
The problem with this is that it obfuscates the drop off between what the strikers’ 
rhetoric was and how their principles held up on the ground.  Most recently 
historians have begun grappling with the possibility that conservative social 
forces, such as the Americanism displayed by Kern County strikers, should not 
be left unchallenged as merely “genuine expressions” in need of an empathetic 
lens.         
4.3 The Pivoting Nature of American Conservatism 
The modern discourse on American nationalism and conservatism has 
once again thrown historians into a state of bewilderment.  At a recent meeting 
facilitated by the American Historical Association, historians eagerly convened to 
discuss what the 2016 election of Donald Trump meant with regards to our 
understanding of American conservatism.  There was a shared sense of disarray.  
Twenty years ago historians had figured out how to talk about conservatism as a 
“politically robust and complicated phenomenon” that moved through American 
                                                
192 Nehls, “A Grand and Glorious,” 8-9. 
193 Thompson-Tozier, “Armed,” 34. 
 52 
history with a “slow and steady hand,” similar to the wandering drawl of William 
Buckley.194 
In attendance was Seth Cotlar, history professor at Willamette University, 
who stated, “The last 200-plus years of American history have been like a series 
of West Wing episodes and then [last] November, someone sat on the remote 
and now we’re watching a marathon of Curb Your Enthusiasm.”195  Questions 
floated around the meeting such as, how can one “understand empathically” an 
American conservatism that blatantly crosses the line into white nationalism?  
The old notion of “colorblind conservatism” seemed violently drawn into question.   
Another professor, Joshua Lynn, argued that our previous understanding 
of American conservatism was perhaps never as solid as we thought it was.  He 
stated, “The definition of conservatism and the designation of who is 
conservative have always been contested...Adding the debate over Trump’s 
conservatism to the mix does not destabilize American conservatism as a 
historical category.  Because it has never been a stable category.”196  If the 
meeting generated a consensus at all, it was that many traditional definitions of 
conservatism have officially proven themselves inept. 
Rick Perlstein observed that, “If Hofstadter was overly dismissive of how 
conservatives understood themselves, the new breed of historians at times 
proved too credulous.”197  Whether or not all of the old characterizations of 
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American conservatism must be thrown out is still unsettled.  Kim Phillips-Fein 
argued in 2011 that, “Historians who write about the right should find ways to do 
so with a sense of the dignity of their subjects, but they should not hesitate to 
keep an eye out for the bizarre, the unusual, or the unsettling.”198  What has 
become clear is that the old descriptions of American conservatism, if not thrown 
out, must be heavily supplemented by factors such as a propensity for violence, 
superstition and racism.199 
4.4 Where the Strike Stands 
In 1921 the oil workers of the San Joaquin Valley demonstrated a few 
things.  First that the discourse of “us vs. them” in labor disputes could be 
severely complicated by workers’ identities.200  The oil workers’ movement grew 
from a conservative mindset, one fostered by the Wilsonian era, anti-radicalism 
and the Americanism of the Legion.  Through action and rhetoric they hitched 
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their material class desires to ideological nationalism and got caught in between 
its larger transitioning in American politics.  Oil workers chose to strike, but did so 
without fully embracing their class identity, and this proved detrimental to the 
growth of their movement.201  Secondly, once their movement became fused with 
the identity of Americanism, it proved difficult for oil workers to maintain the 
“idealism” that identity called for.  The movement that was supposed to be “moral 
and sober” frequently proved to be the opposite, and upon the strike’s conclusion 
many disillusioned oil workers and supporters that had once embraced the 
Legion’s Americanism fell into the nativism of the Klan.  To study the California 
Oil Strike of 1921 is to explore the unusual.  The case complicates our 
understanding of when and how labor intersects with identity, and it also provides 
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CHAPTER 5  
LIMITS TO GROWTH & CONSERVATIVE OPERATIONS 
Officially the American Legion post in Kern County never actually 
endorsed the 1921 strike.  John R. Quinn, commander of the California 
department of the Legion, publicly announced, “The American Legion is strictly 
neutral in all labor controversies,” and that men on either side of the conflict were 
acting “as individuals and not members of this organization.”202  However, on the 
ground relations were much more homogenous. Legionnaires looked out for one 
another with a strict sense of patriotism, and Legion halls were “thrown open to 
members of the strike’s law and order committees,” where cots, coffee and 
sandwiches were served up.203 
 Legionnaires in Kern county were always quick to identify as American 
citizens before union men, and the Oil Workers Union and local labor press 
always sought to court them, not the other way around.  Even prior to the strike 
the Union Labor Journal of Bakersfield wrote, “Labor men will be making a great 
mistake if they fail to take their proper places in the American Legion. The 
mistake will be more disastrous to themselves than to any one else.  If labor men 
would have the American Legion reflect in any degree the ideals of labor they 
must see to it that labor’s opinion is represented in the Legion.”204  The early 
relationship between labor and the Legion was not as bitterly antagonistic as it 
would later be, but it was far from warm.  By 1920 large unions such as the 
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United Mine Workers were already distancing themselves from the Legion, 
ordering rank and file to resign from the organization and beware of Legion strike 
breaking.205 
 The conservative Oil Workers Union attempted to placate the Legion and 
ignore the notion that union men and Legionnaires were fundamentally different.  
The Kern County Labor Council claimed, “the interests of the great majority of the 
members of the American Legion are known to be identical with the aims and 
aspirations of organized labor.”206  When the union voted to strike it was 
understood that the nature of the strike would heavily reflect the character of the 
thousands of Legionnaires present in the oil fields.  Local papers exclaimed, 
“Bakersfield labor backs American Legion!”207  If the relationship did not look 
hostile, it certainly looked lopsided.   
The Legion’s sense of nationalism was dominant and unwavering.  Walter 
Yarrow’s first telegram to the Labor Department resisted calling out the 
government, and instead merely alluded to a “lack of decisiveness.”208  The union 
failed to extend the strike to thousands of oil men working in refinery and pipeline 
positions due to “patriotic motives.”209  Strikers wished no harm to befall the 
“Great Pacific Fleet,” and “wanted to give the government the opportunity to 
show it is interested in some phases of our economic welfare.”210  The movement 
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consolidated its patriotic image, and clearly articulated that its desires laid in the 
hands of the federal government. 
Newspapers set the stage for grim class warfare, despite the fact that 
none would be found.  The Riverside Daily Press exclaimed, “War Looms Up in 
Kern as Hundreds of Strikers in Oil Fields Act as Self Constituted Police.”211  
Another cried, “Civil War Threatens State as Labor Army Closes its Highways!”212  
Others warned of “another West Virginia” if immediate actions were not taken to 
resolve the labor dispute.213  However, unlike in Mingo County West Virginia, 
where Legionnaires proudly guarded the Dh-4B planes that bombed striking coal 
miners and where they joined other “better people” in patriotic chants for law and 
order, the Legionnaires in Kern County claimed they were the “law and order,” 
distanced themselves from the language of class and placed faith in the 
government above faith in their union.214   
The oil workers movement also detached itself from any sort of radical 
labor element.  I.W.W. organizers were on the scene consulting with union 
leadership the day the strike broke out.215  However, their presence increasingly 
dwindled as the strike progressed and their relationship with Legionnaires grew 
tense.  Oil workers began kicking Wobblies out of the strike zone only four days 
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after its inception, making it clear they had no interest in allowing any radical 
features to influence the design of their movement.216   
Oil workers fervently preferred their “badges of red, white and blue,” to the 
“red cards” of the I.W.W.  Wobblie organizers struggled to grasp what they saw 
as the movement’s bullheadedness and blatant disregard for rigorous class 
consciousness.  George P. West covered the strike for The Nation and noted, “A 
handful of stormy petrels of the I.W.W. who rode the rods into Bakersfield were 
arrested, disarmed and taken before the strikers central committee questioned 
and deported.  The union officers quoted them as saying, “Yes we're I.W.W.’s, 
the tough kind at that, and we can accomplish more in ten minutes here with a 
match than you can in ten years with your tactics.”217  The deportations of 
I.W.W.’s from Kern County became a prominent and consistent feature of the 
strike. 
Vice President of the Oil Workers Union, Harry Baker, was particularly 
compelled to maintain the strike’s utmost conservative image.  He frequently and 
publicly rattled off the numbers of Wobblies kicked out of the strike zone and 
rebuked their strike tactics and calls for “crippling industry.”218  Baker was a 
staunch supporter of the “American Plan” or open shop platform.  In a confusing 
interview with local newspapers, he rambled on about how union men “laboring 
under the open shop plan are members because they highly estimate the value 
of unionized organization,” and that those in favor of the closed shop were not 
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“strongly imbued with the union idea.”219  Far from being a Wobblie strategy, 
even talk of the closed shop was off the table, as the Oil Workers Union further 
honed their conservatism. 
Another way in which the strike’s conservative design hobbled its ability to 
grow beyond the local level was its refusal to call a statewide strike.  Early on 
Yarrow threatened, “if the operators continue their attempts to bring in strike 
breakers and gunmen we will be forced to call out the rest of the workers in the 
state.”220  Union leadership knew exactly what this action would imply.  Claiming, 
“If we call a statewide strike, tying up all oil fields, pipelines and refineries, the 
federal government undoubtedly will take action in one manner or another.”221  
Their goal was to provoke positive federal action on their behalf without 
appearing too aggressive.  This proved to be a tall order for a movement based 
around conservative unionism.    
Despite this, statewide support for the general strike was strong.222  
Workers in the oil fields of Contra Costa, Whittier, Ventura, Santa Paula and 
Fullerton sat on the edge of the union decision fully prepared to join Kern County 
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workers in solidarity.223  Oil unions of the Los Angeles region had been financially 
donating to the San Joaquin Valley strike since its inception.224  Oil workers and 
merchants in Santa Maria were, “practically 100 per cent in support of the strikers 
of the valley.”225  The general strike loomed large in the minds of both workers 
and operators.  The Kern County movement was poised to over double in size 
and incorporate a much broader scope of union ideas. 
Once again however the conservative principles of the Oil Workers Union 
in Kern County proved too strong.  The potential growth of a broad-based 
unionism fell second to the notion of unionism centered around absolute faith in 
the government and the identity of Americanism.  Union leadership met on 
September 23 and voted not to call a statewide strike.  Yarrow left the meeting 
declaring, "I will recommend to the district council that they defer calling the 
general strike in compliance with the request of the government, as it is our 
constant desire to recognize the United States authorities in all dealings in this 
matter.  We are prepared to fight this battle to the last trench and we believe that 
we have the government on our side in this controversy.”226  It was the last time a 
general strike would be proposed and from this moment on the Kern County 
strike grew increasingly insular, its workers patriotically clinging to their identities 
and a staunch belief in their government.  
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The closest Kern County oil workers came to approaching radicalism was 
on the issue of nationalization, but even here their conservatism caused them to 
waver and never fully articulate rank and file desires.  Several oil fields in western 
Kern County had been government leases since the war, but were now operated 
by the region’s large oil companies.  Once the strike shut down production on 
these leases, rumors circulated the fields that the government was going to 
swoop in and take control of daily operations.227  Oil workers were ecstatic, 
exclaiming, “We would be glad to work for the government!”228  This was a 
stance that Legionnaires engaged in the strike could easily find agreeable.  For 
these strikers there was little distinction between working an oil lease for the 
federal government and serving in the U.S. military.229 
Operators immediately jumped on the issue to remind everyone involved 
in the oil workers movement that this was the era “less government in business,” 
and that there was nothing patriotic about peace time nationalization of 
industry.230  Al Weil, attorney to the Oil Producers Association, declared that 
government intervention in the oil industry had led to a “slackness,” and made 
workers lazy and ignorant of how American capitalism worked.231  M.H. Whittier, 
president of the Association, cried, “striking oil workers in Fresno and Kern 
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County have transformed this district into a little Russia!”232  Oil operators were 
able to keep their attacks cloaked in the vague language of the red scare, while 
at the same time not appearing grossly anti-American themselves.  
 What made it worse for oil workers was that they were never able to 
articulate that nationalization of industry was what they wanted.  Early on R.H. 
Frazer argued that, “on the question of nationalization the oil workers have not 
made this an issue,” only to vaguely add that, “they believe that in the not far 
distant future petroleum and other natural resources will be operated...for the 
benefit of the entire citizenship of the nation.”233  Weeks into the strike Yarrow 
reiterated that, “workers have no desire to nationalize the industry.”234  However, 
when Legionnaires spoke on the issue themselves they failed to argue it was 
necessary, but also failed to dispel it out right.  In a telegram to the Labor 
Department Legionnaires in the oil fields argued, “we believe that bringing 
government ownership to industry will necessitate a change in the attitude of the 
people of the nation toward that issue.  If these things are done it will be long 
after the oil wells in California now producing, cease to produce.”235  The oil 
workers continued to appear confused about how much to demand from their 
situation. 
The identity of Americanism that workers rooted themselves in did not 
allow for “ideal” citizens to make political economic demands on their 
government.  Instead Legionnaires like those that filled the ranks of the oil 
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workers movement, “denied the legitimacy of race, ethnicity, and particularly 
class as the primary reference point for one’s political obligation.”236  To them if 
nationalization of industry was going to come about at all, it was going to come 
about through a consensus reached after the cultivation of American nationalism.  
This inherently vague articulation was demonstrated throughout the strike, and it 
offered little internal understanding of the issue within the movement, much less 
outside the Kern County region. 
The Kern County oil workers had obliged the federal government in every 
manner possible right up to the end of the strike on November 2, the moment 
they abandoned their movement proved no different.  One week prior President 
Harding had delivered perhaps the most talked about speech of his 
presidency.237  He rambled about “the color line” in America, rivetingly calling for 
“political equality” between blacks and whites, while at the same time arguing 
that both were fundamentally different and would never amalgamate.238  The 
audience sat particularly flummoxed.  
However, Harding did end the speech on familiar refrain, one that the 
Republican regime of the 1920s was in absolute agreement on; that civil 
disobedience of any kind would not be tolerated.  Newspapers of the Kern 
County region heard this above all else.  Harding exclaimed, “We are unshaken 
by the world cataclysm, we hold our foundations to be eternally right...The nation 
will tolerate the threat of no minority which challenges the supremacy of the law 
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or endangers our common welfare.”239  The oil workers of Kern County had 
crafted a movement based on conservatism and the identity of Americanism, and 
by late October 1921 still clung to the belief that they were acting in accordance 
with national civic values and that the federal government would vindicate them.  
Surely the president was not talking about them. 
The Oil Workers Union had been anxiously awaiting a response from the 
Labor Department for months, and on October 30 they got one.  Secretary of 
Labor James Davis telegraphed the union requesting an end to the strike for “the 
resumption of production in this great basic industry which is so vital to the 
nation.”240  Members of the union met and concluded that, “in the face of the 
government's request they could not do otherwise than vote to return to work.”241  
The oil workers movement had come to a rather anticlimactic and ideologically 
dazed conclusion. 
R.H. Frazer confirmed that they had ended the strike due to the 
government’s request, but that the union was still as strong as ever.242  Whitney 
Thompson-Tozier argues that, “If the government had not halted the strike, the oil 
workers had enough community support, resources, and drive to continue the 
strike longer.”243  However, after the decision to end the strike, the ensuing 
months saw no revitalization or redesign of the oil workers movement, no rebirth 
of unionism and certainly no pull to the left.   
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Quam-Wickham notes the sense of betrayal that was felt throughout the 
oil fields.244  The movement had “pinned its faith to Uncle Sam’s signature” only 
to be left out to dry.  George West had greatly admired the oil workers 
insurgence, but early on questioned their methods, claiming,  
If Americanism means anything the oil workers will be vindicated in 
everything they have done and will go back to work with renewed 
enthusiasm for their constructive work in real economic and political 
democracy.  If Americanism doesn't mean anything then Yarrow has taken 
the most effective means of demonstrating it and 8,000 oil workers and as 
many more as can put two and two together will have had a liberal 
education in the structure and function and animus of the established 
order.245 
 
The conservative design and Americanism of the oil workers movement had 
gotten them nowhere in the context of the 1921 strike.  These elements had 
worked to constrict the movement’s growth, muddle its desires and provide the 
workers with no alternative option but to concede and ponder the fallout.         
The discourse surrounding American nationalism had officially shifted from 
the Wilson variety to that of Harding, where there was no room for strikes 
regardless of how patriotic they claimed to be and where business was given free 
reign.  This was all coupled with a reinstatement of American isolationism.  
Harding stated, “I think it's an inspiration to patriotic devotion to safeguard 
America first, to stabilize America first, to prosper America first, to think of 
America first, to exalt America first, to live for and revere America first.”246  The 
language is not far off from that which the Kern County oil workers had attempted 
to utilize.  David Montgomery once noted, “A movement that agrees to side with 
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the patriotic cause of its government, can not only not be attacked but actually 
encouraged in its growth…but then the question is can you break with that?  Can 
you go back out on your own?”247  Despite the fact that the oil workers movement 
had clung to American nationalism throughout the 1921 strike, the move never 
encouraged its growth, and ultimately demonstrated that it could not break from 
that identity and redesign itself along any other lines of labor unionism. 
One local editorial prefigured the political economic mood that would 
dominate the remainder of the decade stating,  
The strike really is an aftermath of the war. The result of government 
interference in business. It is another Wilson administration legacy. The 
workmen hoped to force the oil companies to make their wage 
agreements through the government, as they were persuaded from 
Washington to do during the war. The employers refused. Both sides are 
beginning to appreciate the wisdom of President Harding's policy, of less 
government in business. The road to normalcy is long and rough, but 
we’re making progress.248  
 
Kern County oil workers knew that Harding was speaking to them when on 
December 6 1921 he exclaimed that, “It is not desirable that labor shall be 
permitted to exact unfair terms of employment or subject the public to actual 
distresses in order to enforce its terms.”249  The Kern County Oil Strike of 1921 
demonstrated to be a stunningly conservative movement, one that often looked 
to be more rooted in Americanism than any middle-of-the-road or radical 
unionism.  What had been the public distresses of the “most moral and sober 
strike ever pulled?” 
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5.1 How “Moral and Sober” Could it Have Possibly Been?  
Recent work on the strike has recognized its unusual patriotic fervor, but 
has overwhelmingly perceived it as something rather incorruptible.250  This 
glosses over the fact that an entire seismic discourse, concerning what American 
nationalism should look like and how it should operate, was being formulated in 
this period beginning with the “preparedness movement” and ending in the 1920s 
with the “return to normalcy.”  The type of nationalism that the American Legion 
was helping to create after WWI was based upon an interpretation and protection 
of citizenship that was ideologically disconnected from forms of social 
identification such as class, race and ethnicity.  It insisted that Americans engage 
in a “narrowly-defined set of civic behaviors” based in anti-radicalism and 
indifference to civic and political life.251 
Nehls argues that the American Legion was based upon fundamental 
idealism.252  The organization’s members believed that rejecting class, racial and 
ethnic identities would create a more homogenous nation, and that suppressing 
radicalism would preserve American democratic institutions that allowed for 
political and economic equality.  The idealism of the Legion demanded that 
American citizens adopt a new civic identity, while upholding a commitment to 
law and order.   
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Nehls’s primary contention is that, “Only by taking the way the Legion 
constructed its nationalistic vision seriously and understanding its unique 
historical context can the full depth of the Legion’s conservative impact on 
American political culture in the 20th century come more clearly into view.”253  
This sentiment was the dominant historiographical stance through the 1990s and 
2000s.  Accusations that American conservatism and its practitioners were 
nothing more than crazed, racist and conspiracy-minded were replaced with 
empathetic analyses that sought to depict American conservatives as rational 
actors.   
However, recent historians have found this framework complicated by 
forces within the broad sweep of American conservatism that defy fitting neatly 
into the characterizations of “rational,” “colorblind” or in the words of Lisa McGirr, 
“thoroughly modern.”254  Rick Perlstein recently argued, “Future historians won’t 
find all that much of a foundation for Trumpism in the grim essays of William F. 
Buckley, the scrupulous constitutionalist principles of Barry Goldwater or the 
bright-eyed optimism of Ronald Reagan. They’ll need instead to study 
conservative history’s political surrealists and intellectual embarrassments, its 
con artists and tribunes of white rage.”255  He concluded with a tepid call to arms, 
stating that if historians are going to attempt to craft new histories of American 
Conservatism, that “the first step may be to risk being impolite.”256  Perhaps 
another way of grappling with the history of American Conservatism, while 
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inescapably situated in a modern context, is to recognize that it is broad enough 
to encapsulate contradictory ideas, and that above all sometimes the operations 
of this social force can simply be strange, crazed or alarming. 
The Kern County Oil Workers Movement of 1921 must be placed in this 
larger context.  Nehls himself contends that the idealism of the American Legion 
is impossible to situate disconnected from its racial conceptions, proclivity for 
violence and its capacity for irrationality and conspiracy building.257  The 
perception that the Kern County strike was entirely “moral and sober” neglects 
the fact on the ground the situation was quite tense, that Legionnaire strikers 
were blatantly racist and were regularly engaged in violence against members of 
the community throughout the strike zone.258   
 The analysis sits on a knife's edge. One moment the strike fails because 
it is too conservative, and the next it defies being characterized as peaceful.  The 
fine point is that the movement was conservative in terms of its design and 
identity; the strikers may not have been “moral and sober,” but that does not 
mean that they were not conservative.  Typically the relationship between labor 
disputes and lawlessness is conjoined by some form of labor radicalism that 
either looks to engage in sabotage or violent self-defense, but in Kern County 
radicalism was disdained.  When oil workers broke down and engaged in 
violence it was not for the sake of labor radicalism, crippling of industry, 
destruction of private property or dishing blows to outfits of “law and order.”  
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When they engaged in violence it was frantic, ideologically scattered and often 
aimed at people supposedly breaking with “law and order” and the moral idealism 
of the American Legion.  Upon the strike’s conclusion oil workers stuck it out in 
Kern County under worse conditions or were seen “leaving Kern's westside 
fields, carrying nothing but their ‘blanket rolls’ and trekking southward to the oil 
fields of the Los Angeles basin.”259  However, another contingent of oil workers 
as well as local people that had supported the strike, grew disillusioned by the 
demonstration of Americanism the Legion had shown and instead turned to the 
newly rising Klan of the San Joaquin Valley.         
5.2 The Oil Workers and Race 
Nehls has argued that, “the Legion’s approach towards racial difference 
was more complicated than simple nativism. Immigrants and other racial 
minorities had to fit into the Legion’s broader nationalizing agenda.”260  The 
idealism of the Legion had to leave open the possibility that racial or ethnic 
identifications could be overcome in order to establish a more perfect American 
citizenry.  However, this was never a real possibility with the Legion in Kern 
County or for the oil workers movement.261  Quam-Wickham notes that early on 
one of the principle identities oil workers rallied around prior to unionization in 
1917 was Asian exclusion.262  This dimension of the Kern County oil worker 
never left. 
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 In 1920 the population of Kern County was 97% white and 86% native 
born.263  This made it the fourth largest county in the state to boast high 
demographic marks for Americanism, and the bulk of these pockets ran along the 
entirety of the western oil fields.264  Compared to low-paying factory jobs on 
either coastline that siphoned off massive working immigrant populations right up 
to 1924, work in the oil fields attracted white native-born workers seeking 
opportunity to move into the skilled trades.  Quam-Wickham and Thompson-
Tozier note the large degree of improvisation that took place on the job and 
allowed for a more fluid degree of upward mobility in the trade.265  
 Despite Nehls’s contention that, “the Legion remained committed to the 
fundamentally Progressive idea that outsiders could become American,” the 
moral idealism of Legion rhetoric failed to ever take root in Kern County.266  This 
is most aptly demonstrated by the 1921 proposal for a Japanese agriculture 
colony.  Supporters of the proposal were few, and argued that the Japanese 
appeared “highly successful” in the cultivation of grapes, melons and other fruits 
throughout the surrounding counties of Fresno and Ventura.267  They even 
contended that, “their presence in the community is necessary for adequate 
growth and prosperity.”268  However, reactions against the proposal were 
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overwhelming and constituted a strong local alliance predicated upon local Anglo 
identity. 
David Roediger reminds us that workers operating under hegemony are 
still historical actors “who make choices and create their own cultural forms.”269  
Oil workers of Kern County were not victims of an imposed top down racism, but 
rather part of a white coalition between themselves and other community 
members.  Similar to how oil workers conceived of their strike in terms of 
Americanism, so too did they utilize this identity and ideology in their efforts to 
preserve the region’s whiteness.  Legionnaires considered rejection of the 
Japanese as “their duty as loyal Americans.”270           
Alexander Saxton argues that, “Once California had filled, pushed and 
pulled the cart of Chinese exclusion to its legislative destination, no sleight of 
hand was needed to turn attention to the Japanese.”271  Kern County workers 
had effectively kept Asians out of oil jobs right from the industry’s inception, and 
as the 1914 “tankies” strike reveals, “the pleasures of whiteness could function 
as a wage for white workers.”272  The fact that oil workers were still finding time to 
vote for immigrant bans and voice racist opinions despite being in the midst of a 
massive labor dispute is salient.273  The 1921 proposal for a Japanese agriculture 
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colony demonstrates that oil workers and members of the community were 
unwilling to abandon their white native-born identity by welcoming in outsiders, 
and that their form of conservative unionism was going to run parallel to these 
interests.274   
A prime example of such a Kern County resident was Thomas W. 
McManus, a Legionnaire and Chairman of the National Committee on Oriental 
Immigration.  McManus lived in the Bakersfield region, worked as a real estate 
subdivider and was sympathetic to the oil workers movement; believing that the 
identity behind Americanism possessed a strong underlying social glue for Kern 
county residents including oil strikers.275  He exclaimed, “It is better for us to 
make less money, but to keep our American and white population.”276  He 
continued, “Without exception every community in California that has suffered 
from the blight of the presence of this unassimilable Asiatic race...let us maintain 
the barrier against the influx of Oriental typhoon!”  McManus reflected a popular 
sentiment in Kern County and the Legion’s ineptitude when it came to engaging 
their own ideals surrounding overcoming racial and ethnic identity. 
The oil workers movement was in resounding agreement with McManus 
and condemned “the importation of Japanese labor...or any other alien 
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population.”277  A unanimous county vote shot down the colony proposition and 
preserved the region's racial makeup.278  Union members, Legionnaires and 
numerous other county officials were all in agreement that, “Kern County was the 
only fertile district in California not yet overrun by the orientals” and they intended 
to keep it that way.279   
Historiographically we must come to terms with the fact that the American 
conservatism the Kern County oil workers movement embodied was never one 
that engaged in a pro-Americanization agenda.  Despite the fact that the 
overwhelming majority of strikers were Legionnaires, whose organizational 
rhetoric included the ability to recognize “the potential for individuals to transcend 
their race and become American in full,” this was never seen in the Kern County 
oil fields.280  This was merely one component of their identity, but it should work 
to throw into question how empathetic historians of American conservatism can 
be when there exists a blatant racial dimension to the nation building agenda of 
this time period.281 
5.3 A Propensity for Violence 
The most “moral and sober strike ever pulled” was frequently violent.  The 
movement’s “law and order committees” were allegedly designed to enforce 
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prohibition and gambling laws, ensure private property was protected and 
apprehend both strike breakers and radical agitators.  They were composed 
almost entirely of Legionnaires due to their military training and exclaimed that 
they were “pledged to patriotic maintenance of Law and Order in all oil field 
localities.”282  Committee bylaws such as “no heated arguments,” “do not exceed 
the speed limit” and “do not carry firearms” were broken on an almost nightly 
basis as Legionnaires held conservative American patriotism in one hand and 
violent impulses in the other.283 
 The patriotic rhetoric of the oil workers movement was not far off from 
what high ranking Legion officials were calling for, but struggling to maintain.  
American Legion National Commander Franklin D’Olier reminded members in 
1919 that,  
We must always clearly bear in mind that any disposition on the part of 
individual members of the Legion or of local posts to take law into their 
own hands, to regulate by force or demonstration of forceful intent what is 
contrary to our interpretation of one hundred percent Americanism, or to 
act as self-constituted vigilance committees in disregard of lawful and 
properly constituted authority, is not only subversive of the principles and 
ideals of The American Legion but will weaken and tend to destroy our 
influence for good in this country.284 
 
Once again the idealism of the Legion was to be challenged.  It insisted on lawful 
civic participation, and as Nehls has contended it was fully capable of this.  
However, Legionnaires including the oil strikers of Kern County also proved that 
idealistic conservatism amidst deteriorating economic conditions bred an 
atmosphere where violence was increasingly looked to as an answer. 
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The roadblock system of the strike zone was as extensive as it was 
vigilant.  Every highway leading into the westside fields was equipped with a 
roadblock and guard outfit from the “law and order committees.”  Even on rural 
highways such as State Route 58 and 166, motorists traveling into Kern County 
were stopped in the dead of night, interrogated and forced to “explain their 
presence to the satisfaction of the striker guard.”285  After night fall, on the 
highways and in the oil fields, tensions between strikers and whomever they 
encountered grew high. 
Upon the strike’s inception sheriff D.B. Newell and local constables 
worked to deputize strikers throughout Kern County; a testament to the local 
political clout of the oil workers union and the advances they had made through 
the war period.286  The early success of the strike should not be understated.287  
“Law and Order Committees” were particularly adept at intercepting strike 
breakers and effectively crafted what oil producers saw as a corrupt fiefdom or 
“little Russia.”288   
However, the strikers also attempted to heavily control what was said 
about their movement in the press.  They wrapped their image around the 
identity of conservative Americanism and did everything they could to preserve it.  
Upon entering the strike zone members of the press would be intercepted and 
then brought to the “central strike committee” where they were questioned in 
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regards to their intentions and credentials.289  It was not uncommon for those that 
“failed to win favor with the committee” to be escorted out of the strike zone.290  
Activities of the “Law and Order Committees” never completely sat right with local 
press and their relationship grew tense over the course of the strike. 
Violence was encouraged as the strike wore on and only worked to fuel a 
sense of frenzy.  Union leadership offered strikers advice for how to handle 
potential saboteurs exclaiming, “The best way to answer him is to hit him 
between the eyes, quickly, so that lie and the companies for whom he is working 
cannot bring discredit upon you and your organization!”291  Strikers hung effigies 
from bridges leading into the strike zone all adorned with placards warning 
agitators of the consequences for disrupting law and order.292  Despite the rage 
oil workers felt towards saboteurs and strike breakers, Quam-Wickham notes 
that oil operators halted all attempts to bring in such forces after the September 
14 train incident.293  Ensuing violence throughout the strike zone was directed 
against those perceived to have violated the movement’s conception of law and 
order, one that paralleled the Legion’s moral idealism. 
On the evening of September 18 George M. Wilkins, a Kern County real 
estate agent, was traveling back from a camping trip in the Yosemite Valley with 
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his wife and their nine-year-old son when they were stopped by strikers near the 
McKittrick oil fields.  They had begun to slow down as they approached the 
roadblock when shots rang out striking the vehicle.  Wilkins drove forward before 
being stopped by the gunmen who then proceeded to interrogate the family, 
claiming that they were looking for contraband and sought to search the vehicle.  
After a heated debate between Wilkins and the leader of the “committee,” Wilkins 
began to pull forward and depart the roadblock, as he did a “fusillade” of bullets 
came reigning down upon the vehicle narrowly missing his son and wife.  They 
managed to evade the barrage and continue on into Bakersfield, their car riddled 
with bullets.294  
Despite similar accounts mounting, Sheriff Newell continued to reiterate 
that, “the whole situation is being handled by deputy constables forming the law 
and order committees...and that he has no control over the constables or their 
deputies.”295  Kern County residents unaffiliated with the strike did not hesitate to 
leave town while the time was ripe.  Local reports indicated massive “outbound 
traffic from the strike districts” with automobiles “carrying large amounts of 
baggage” as well as “family chickens and pets.”296  Harry J. Baker, director of the 
strike in the Kern River district, attempted to console residents of the oil 
communities stating that violence “was not sanctioned by the organization and 
instead was the work of a few impulsive men.”297  District Attorney J.R. Dorsey, 
who had been put in office with heavy oil worker support two years prior, toured 
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the oil fields on September 21 also in an attempt to alleviate public distress.298  
He concluded that “the reports of lawlessness...have been exaggerated” and 
instead “the record for law and order is excellent.”299  Roadblocks as well as 
violence on the highways and in the oil fields persisted despite the consolations. 
Independent oil workers and foremen at operational derricks, 
disassociated with the Oil Producers Association, often working small leases in 
western Kern, did not fare well under strike conditions.  Members of the strike’s 
“law and order committees” visited one such operator the night of September 21, 
stopped his wife and their nine year old daughter near Pentland Junction in 
Maricopa and shot up their vehicle after another heated debate on the 
highway.300  In another instance two oil workers on the Pacific Oil Company 
lease in Coalinga were severely beaten, one of them crippled, with “claw 
hammers” by Kern County oil strikers, simply for working a lease unaffected by 
the strike.301  Local reports indicated that Coalinga, the south-western tip of 
Fresno County, was “being overrun by strange strikers from the Taft-Bakersfield 
fields.”302  Oil strikers could hardly leave that region alone.  They returned days 
later with another “fusillade,” firing round after round at the Pacific Oil derricks 
where workmen toiled through the night.303  Violence in the Coalinga district 
continued to be particularly bad throughout the remainder of the strike in large 
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part because Fresno County sheriff W.F. Jones had not been propped up by the 
union and was therefore more willing to clash with “law and order committees” 
when they enacted violence against workmen and county residents.304 
“Law and order committee” violence always took a scattergun approach.  
Any oilmen not in line with the strike were susceptible to vigilante violence, even 
though the overwhelming majority of them were neither scabs nor strike 
breakers. The heated altercations on the highways often revolved around 
whether or not people being stopped in the strike zone were saboteurs, 
bootleggers or agitators, but often violence was enacted against those that did 
not fit into any of these categories and simply had refused to recognize the 
authority of the “law and order committees.”   
Enough of these accounts finally made their way back to District Attorney 
Dorsey, who then exclaimed that, “shootings on the highways must stop!”305  
Union officials also joined in condemning the violence, and both articulated that 
the “law and order committees” were not acting in accordance with their own 
principles of patriotism.306  When Martin Madsen of the governor’s office met with 
“law and order committee” members in the fields they responded by arguing that 
“the law was read to use” and that any American citizen could stop a vehicle on 
public highways provided they maintain “law and order.”307  Legionnaires that 
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comprised these committees were clearly improvising what their Americanism 
meant.308 
By mid-October the strike was over a month old and Kern County 
residents had grown weary.  One editorial fondly reflected on the war-period 
when capital and labor were forced into industrial harmony and “there was a daily 
manifestation of patriotism of the highest order.”309  Oil strikers were attempting 
to rally their movement around such patriotism, but it proved to be a difficult 
maneuver.   
Out of sheer desperation, “law and order committees” took to intimidating 
local news outlets such as the Shafter Progress just outside Bakersfield.  Local 
editor H.M. Calkins had been reporting on the increasing violence throughout the 
strike zone when “committee members” visited him to decry that “through the 
articles in question he was injuring their cause.”310  Calkins replied that, “he did 
not represent either side in the oil strike controversy, but as long as lawlessness 
was practiced here he would give the same publicity.”311  Calkins’s skepticism of 
the strikers’ “moral and sober” cause was not isolated.  As the strike drew to a 
close and Yarrow asked for merchant endorsements within his final barrage of 
telegrams to Labor Secretary Davis, Kern County merchants officially declared 
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themselves non-aligned despite having aided the movement in the early 
weeks.312   
The Americanism of the oil workers movement had limited their growth at 
the same time it had failed to garner the full embrace of the Kern County 
community.  The violence surrounding the 1921 oil strike is not difficult to 
uncover, but its ideological underpinning is difficult to diagnose.  It best 
resembled the violence the American Legion would become known for as the 
decade ensued, directed towards those that broke with the perceived conduct of 
“proper citizenship.”  Nehls states, “Vigilantism, therefore, was part of the 
conversation the Legion had both within its own bounds and with society at large 
about the nature of American nationalism and good citizenship.313  As we have 
seen, the conservative design of the oil workers movement hobbled its options, 
and as the identity of Americanism, that the majority of strikers embraced over 
class, failed to pay the same dividends it had during the Wilsonian era, 
vigilantism was adopted as an anecdote for deteriorating economic conditions.  
When the strike concluded on November 3 and strikers were “hamstrung by their 
frequent pronouncements of patriotism, duty, and deference,” there was no mass 
pull to the left, instead a portion of oil workers and former strike supporters turned 
to the conservative nativism of the Klan.314  An organization that would not offer 
ailing workers class consolation, but would at least offer infinite scapegoating and 
a deeper perpetuation of lawlessness. 
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5.4 More American-than-thou 
The second iteration of the Klan in 1920s America was the closest the 
organization came to mainstream.  Recent historiography has shown that 
contrary to the popular perception of the Klan, as overtly southern and anti-black, 
the Klan of the 1920s was strikingly wide-spread on the national level and 
primarily animated by what members saw as violations of Americanism.315  The 
nebulous nature of these transgressions aided the second Klan’s growth.  In 
post-war America, acts that deviated from the nation’s perceived “moral code” 
could be easily found, ranging from radicalism and drinking to immigrants and 
promiscuity.  The Klan sought to reestablish an “idealized American identity,” one 
that had been menaced by the social turbulence of the war period.   
The Klan’s presence in the San Joaquin Valley during this period has 
been widely studied.316  However, not enough has been done to provoke the idea 
of a rich historical overlap between the 1921 oil strike and the rise of the Klan in 
Kern County.317  It remains difficult to escape the feeling that such an overlap 
exists, particularly when it comes to the larger discourse surrounding 
Americanism, what it should look like and how it should operate.  The oil workers 
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movement had embraced the identity of Americanism, and in many ways had 
placed it above their conception of class and labor unionism.  When this 
maneuvering finally led to the movement’s capitulation, the fallout left oil workers 
and supportive community members to ponder what Americanism meant and 
what it was good for. 
The fallout from the strike was severe.  Union secretary E.B. Daniel wired 
Labor Secretary Davis and decried the treatment of oil workers returning back to 
work.  He stated, “approximately 70% of the strikers have been re-employed, but 
the remaining 30% are being badgered and in many instances blacklisted openly, 
and even a large percentage of those working are continually being intimidated 
by petty officialdom!”318  The strike had been called off for “industrial peace,” but 
little peace would be found in the western oil fields for the ensuing months.   
After the strike the majority of oil workers migrated south to the oil fields of 
Los Angeles where the communities of La Brea and Signal Hill had begun 
dominating the industry’s output.319  However, another contingent stayed in Kern, 
joined the ranks of the Klan and by February 1922 were actively doubling down 
on the vigilantism that had marked the strike period.  Through winter and spring 
the westside oil districts were beset with “hooded terror” ranging from beatings to 
tar and featherings, as Klan members publicly announced, “we demand that the 
town of Taft and the county of Kern be made clean, and that happiness and 
welfare be safeguarded.”320  When W.E.B. Dubois spoke of the 1920s Klan in 
America he argued, “total depravity, human hate and shaden-fruede do not fully 
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explain the mob spirit in this land.  Before the wide eyes of the mob is ever the 
shape of fear.”321  The Kern Klan was afraid the social fabric of the community 
was ripping, and they sought to articulate what their “ideal” form of American 
citizenship should look like and how its citizens should behave.   
Quam-Wickham’s small segment on the Klan requires greater unpacking.  
She argues that, “Night riders targeted local merchants and residents who had 
supported the strike, as well as oil workers who had been blacklisted for their 
strike activities.”322  However, she also concedes that a significant portion of oil 
strikers were the ones turning to the Klan.323  It appears that the Klan’s “cleaning” 
up of Kern was primarily an in-house procedure.  The majority of their violence 
was directed towards individuals, former strikers or otherwise, that had been 
actively violating the “moral” dimension of Americanism exhibited during the 
strike.  Eli Andrews was targeted for “bootlegging and peddling drugs” during the 
strike.324  Dr. Dwight Mason was targeted for alleged adultery.325  Druggist 
George Bowman of Taft was severely beaten and “dragged through an oil sump” 
for allegedly selling alcohol prescriptions to oil workers during the strike.326  
George Pettye was beaten for alleged adultery, while others were dropped out in 
the middle of the desert and told to “seek employment.”327   
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A Hanford Sentinel editorial stated,  
It is not entirely a far-fetched theory that the loose action of Kern county 
officials during the oil strikes, when they permitted misuse of authority by 
those not intended to serve as peace officers, has in a measure influenced 
the present unlawful situation in the Kern town. When the agents of justice 
fail to do their full duty, the fabric of common sense law is torn.328 
 
In both cases the “misuse of authority” was taken up in the name of Americanism 
and the perceived need to police the Kern County region on the principles of 
“proper citizenship.”   
Nehls argues that both the American Legion and the Ku Klux Klan offered 
competing visions of Americanism through the 1920s.329  Given that both 
organizations were prone to vigilantism and racist thought, the key difference 
was an ideological one.  In theory the Legion believed in “tolerance,” and “the 
premise that it was most desirable to link individuals within American society.”330  
While the Klan obviously believed in the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race, but 
also the “Protestant values of thrift, self-denial, sobriety, and strong work 
ethic.”331   
Between 1921 and 1922, these competing visions of Americanism took 
hold in Kern County, and contextualizing them against the 1921 strike is critical.  
The oil workers movement was completely consumed by the Americanism of the 
Legion, yet it failed to grow beyond the local level and clearly failed to obtain the 
goals of the strike.  It is important to note that there was no large-scale fall from 
grace for former striking Legionnaires and supportive community members.  
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During the fallout from the strike, it was not as if every single oil worker 
disavowed the Americanism of the Legion for that of the Klan.  However, there 
was a portion that did.332   
When interviewed after the strike Walter Yarrow exclaimed there had been 
“a lack of solidarity among oil workers.”333  Yet, internal rifts within the oil worker’s 
movement were never between conservatism and radicalism or class and 
Americanism, as we have seen, progressive unionism much less radicalism, 
were never seriously or effectively considered when it came to the strike’s design 
or methods.  Discussions in Kern revolved around Americanism, and the fallout 
from the strike demonstrated that at least some in the region were willing to 
adopt a starker interpretation. 
Kern County Legion posts struggled to rally Legionnaires after the strike 
as they faced the threat of the Klan’s Americanism.  Legion leaders encouraged 
members in “waking up the ‘buddies’ and impressing them with the necessity of 
keeping their charters alive.”334  Leaders could hardly ignore the “lack of energy” 
felt throughout the posts, but were still determined to make their presence the 
dominant authority on the local level.335  Right into summer news headlines 
exclaimed, “Americanism is the Topic in Taft!”336  
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The sentiment of those Legionnaires that were willing to abandon their 
Americanism for that of the Klan was best articulated by Taft City Marshall 
Roscoe Steele.  When asked about his affiliation with the Klan he argued,  
Yes, I was formerly a member of the Ku Klux Klan, and I joined the Klan in 
Santa Barbara and was obligated as were several others. I went into it 
with my eyes open, and am not trying to pass the buck along.  I am glad to 
see that some of the boys are interested enough in me as to want to know 
my stand in the matter, so in justice to them I will attempt to give my 
opinion.  There is absolutely nothing in the obligation of the Ku Klux Klan 
that is un-American, in fact it tends to make a man a better American and 
if the American Legion had a little more Klannish spirit and less 
selfishness it would be 100 percent American as is the Ku Klux Klan.337   
 
The competing visions of Americanism that were present in Kern County 
at this time should demonstrate something about how we conceive of American 
conservatism as a social force.  Nehls argues that the Legion represented a 
precursor to “class and colorblind interpretation of citizenship that would be vital 
to American conservatism through the rest of the 20th century.”338  In large part, 
this was the case in Kern County.  However, while Alicia Rodriquez shows that 
the Kern Klan essentially folded in on itself amid strong local pushback, she also 
challenges us to understand that affiliation with the Klan never negatively 
impacted members' lives.  Kern County members went on to hold prominent 
positions in other organizations, lead financially successful lives and were easily 
subsumed back into their communities.339  Rick Perlstein reminds us that “In fact, 
the ‘far right’ was never that far from the American mainstream.”340  The Kern 
County case should demonstrate that when conservatism is the dominant driving 
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social force of a movement, it should not be assumed that it will automatically 
operate with the “slow and steady” momentum historians once ascribed to it. 
5.5 Conclusion 
The Kern County Oil Strike of 1921 and its fallout manage both 
bewilderment and rapture.  The entire situation did not occur in a vacuum, it sat 
at the volatile crossroads of a postwar post-Red Scare America, saturated with 
WWI veterans returning from “over there,” Wobblies, Prohibition, shifting 
permutations of capitalism and a particularly conservative Harding administration 
and rising Republican regime.  The case study grew beyond the strike itself and 
became much more about how these elements bounced off one another and 
shaped the ensuing decade.   
Kern County oil workers were no different from other union men in that the 
war-period had been good to them.  American capitalism had undergone drastic 
changes almost overnight with the onset of American involvement in WWI, and 
by 1921 these changes were being undone at a similar pace before Harding and 
the Republican retreat from strong state intervention in labor relations.  The 
“great strike wave” of 1919-1922 was labor’s response. 
The oil workers’ movement had unique flair.  Strikers crafted an image of 
“patriotic unionism,” underpinned by a faith in the federal government, but also by 
the conservatism of the American Legion.  Thousands of Legionnaires filled the 
ranks of the strike, adorned “badges of red, white and blue,” enforced prohibition 
and gambling laws, disdained radicalism and immigration, and “pinned their faith 
to Uncle Sam’s signature.”  The strike lasted six weeks and paralyzed the state 
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oil industry.  It did not end in gruesome class warfare like had been seen mere 
months earlier in the coal mines of West Virginia, but rather in ideological 
confusion and despair.  The oil workers’ movement never fully embraced a class 
identity, instead it embraced the burgeoning conservative identity of 
Americanism.  This effectively hobbled the growth of the movement in several 
ways, and ultimately left it with a lack of alternatives besides capitulation.  Upon 
the strike’s conclusion and despite the fact that their movement’s conservative 
design and identity had not led to any form of success, there was no mass pull to 
the left on the part of oil workers in the San Joaquin Valley.  On the contrary a 
portion of workers and supporters of the strike turned to the nativism of the Klan.   
This analysis first looks to contextualize the Kern County Oil Strike and its 
surrounding events, and then looks to place it alongside larger historical 
discourses.  It sits most broadly and comfortably at the intersection between 
labor or class and identity, but it should also provoke a current dialogue 
regarding American conservatism.  Questions that plague the case of the Kern 
County Oil Workers should be ones that echo through today.  Why would a 
worker choose to identify with a category outside of class, particularly during a 
moment of labor unrest?  Is a balance possible between a worker’s material 
class conditions and their patriotic nationalism?  Why is American nationalism an 
overwhelmingly conservative force?  What is the nature of the relationship 
between American conservatism and labor, and what does this imply about the 
conservative worker?  Is patriotic nationalism a stable vehicle for making class 
gains, and if so can a movement that adopts this strategy ever break with that 
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identity?  These questions should ring out for historians looking to make sense of 
the most recent talk of nationalism despite obviously living in global world, and 
they should draw attention to the mindset of workers, already living in a de-
industrialized country, that now hear the cry for the nation and appear willing to 
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